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Abstract
With the increasing number of users and systems connected to networks,
both Internet and individual systems are in danger of intrusion. Various
intrusion preventions techniques have been implemented to protect com-
puter systems in the form of authentication and rewalls. However, only
the intrusion prevention is not sucient, as those systems become more
complex with the rapid growth and expansion of Internet technology and
local network systems. Therefore, Intrusion Detection Systems are designed
to keep computer systems security by monitoring Internet and individual
systems for suspicious activities. The main intrusion detection techniques
have misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection uses pat-
terns of well known attacks to identify known intrusion activities. Whereas,
it cannot detect unknown attacks without any pre-collected patterns. On
the other hand, anomaly detection relies on the normal patterns to identify
anomalies which deviate signicantly from the normal patterns. But, it
results in more false alarms.
In order to utilize the advantages of both misuse detection and anomaly
detection, a hybrid framework of the intrusion detection system is imple-
mented to combine the advantages of both misuse detection and anomaly
detection using a series of data mining approaches. Class association rules
are inductively learned from network connections and used as the basis of
an intrusion detection system. In this thesis, class association rules are
extracted by Genetic Network Programming(GNP), which is one of evolu-
tionary algorithms. As the quality of the class association rules is essential
for classication, an ecient two-stage rule pruning method intend to reduce
the redundant and irrelevant information in the large number of rules. In
the rst stage, an average matching degree-based method is applied to pre-
prune the rules in order to improve the eciency of Genetic Algorithm(GA).
In the second stage, GA is implemented to pick up the eective rules among
the remaining rules in the rst stage. Simultaneously, in order to solve the
sharp boundary problem in continuous attributes, Fuzzy set theory is inte-
grated into GNP to discover class association rules.
To construct eective intrusion detection systems, classication is another
central aspect to be studied. In this thesis, two classication approaches
are proposed except the basic classier. Distance-based classication ap-
proach makes use of the numeric distance of the new connection to its
closest neighbor points to pre-classify it as normal or intrusion, then sup-
poses the anomaly centroids based on the known information of normal and
misuse intrusions to distinguish it as normal, misuse or anomaly intrusion
accurately. Next, the other classication approach is proposed by comb-
ing the clustering and Gaussian functions to get the accurate boundary of
normal and misuse intrusion.
The eectiveness and advantages of the proposed algorithms have been
objectively evaluated on KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD data sets.
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1Introduction
Since computer virus was rst described by Fred Cohen(1), various types of attacks
proliferated on computers and Internet. Some of them are produced manually by
attackers, which aims at stealing the personal information. Some of them are pro-
grammed by hackers, which aim at disrupting the Internet and infecting other systems
automatically. On the other hand, the number of users and systems connected to the
networks grew dramatically as connecting to networks became more much easier, and
the development of e-commerce and e-government dramatically accelerated this pro-
cess. Many individual persons and organizations prefer using Internet for routine works
and business aairs(2). Thus, security problems become serious in recent years.
Firewalls as a passive defense device is not enough to keep networks secure. There-
fore, dierent kinds of Intrusion Detection Systems(IDSs) are designed to protect com-
puter networks against various attacks. An excellent IDS has some inherent require-
ments. Its prime principle is to detect as many attacks as possible with minimum
number of false alarms. In addition, it is also important to make the system adaptable
and extensible.
1.1 Problems
Nowadays, computer systems are vulnerable to both abuse by insiders and penetration
by outsiders. As dened by the SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security (SANS) in-
stitute, intrusion detection is the act of detecting actions that attempt to compromise
the condentiality, integrity or availability of a resource(3). As a new and retrot ap-
proach, intrusion detection becomes a challenging task since the increased connectivity
1
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of computer systems gives greater access to outsiders and makes it easier for intruders
to avoid identication(4).
On one hand, intrusions can attack the systems within a short time and infect other
systems by Internet quickly. Besides, attackers often come up with newer and more
advanced methods to defeat the installed security systems. In 1988, approximate 5,000
computers through the Internet were rendered unusable within 4 hours by a program
called a worm. In 1993, more users of computer systems were alerted to such dangers
when a set of programs called sniers was placed on many computers run by network
service providers and recorded login names and passwords(5).
On the other hand, the number of host users is growing and the number of cor-
responding connections to Internet is also increasing remarkably. According to the
Internet System Consortium(ISC) survey, the number of hosts on the internet around
900,000,000 in Jan 2012 as Fig. 1.1 shows(6). Correspondingly, P. Lyman et.al. re-
ported the estimated the size of the Internet to be 532,897TB by 2003(7). More and
more business and individual aairs have been done on Internet. Therefore, an eective
Figure 1.1: Internet Domain Survey Host Count
intrusion detection system is urgently needed for everyone.
Current intrusions can be categorized into diverse types. It is a challenge for an
intrusion detection system to detect a wide range of intrusions with few false alarms.
Hundred percent detection and no false alarms are ideal for an intrusion detection
system. It becomes critical to build reliable intrusion detection systems which can
2
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detect dierent types of attacks with very few false alarms in realistic environments.
Therefore, the researches of this thesis aim at building a highly extensible and robust
intrusion detection system.
1.2 Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusions can be generally distinguished into known intrusions and unknown intrusions.
Both two kinds of intrusions may compromise condentiality, integrity or availability
of the systems or computers(8)(9)(3)(10). Therefore, broadly speaking, there are two
kinds of intrusion detection techniques corresponding to known intrusions and unknown
intrusions: misuse detection and anomaly detection(4)(11)(12).
Misuse detection(4)(13) essentially identies the previously known attacks from
normal network connection data. It utilizes the signatures of the known attacks and
matches them against the observed activity. If it matches a previously known attack
signature, the activity will be detected as an attack. However, if a new attack is
produced, the system fails to recognize it. In conclusion, the main advantage of misuse
detection is that it focuses on analyzing the known attacks and produces few false
alarms. The main disadvantage of misuse detection is that it can detect only known
attacks which have dened signatures.
Anomaly detection technique(4)(14)(15) establishes the prole of the normal activi-
ties of the computer or Internet. It looks for the deviation between the observed activity
and normal patterns. Once it does, the observed activity is identied as anomaly in-
trusion. The main advantage of anomaly detection systems is that they can detect
previously unknown attacks. By dening what's normal, they can identify the abnor-
mal whether it is an attack or not. In actual systems, however, it results in a large
number of false alarms. Anomaly detection systems are also dicult to be realized in
highly dynamic environments.
There are two types of intrusion detection systems that employ one or both of the
intrusion detection techniques introduced above(4). The principles of the Host-based
IDS and Network-based IDS are very similar in that intrusion detection is based on
analyzing the observed events for patterns, but their operations are quite dierent(16).
Host-based systems(17)(18)(19) focus their analysis on user activity or program behav-
ior at the operating system or application level, while network-based intrusion detection
3
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systems obtain data by monitoring the trac and examining network packets in the
network to which the hosts are connected(20)(21).
Host-based intrusion detection systems(22) detect intrusions using audit data which
are collected from the target host machine. As the information provided by the audit
data can be extremely comprehensive and elaborate, host-based systems can obtain
high detection rates and few false alarms. However, there are disadvantages for host-
based approaches. Firstly, host-based systems cannot easily prevent attacks: when an
intrusion is detected, the attack has partially occurred. Secondly, audit data may be
altered by attackers, which inuencs the reliability of audit data.
With the development of networks, more and more individual hosts are connected
into local area networks or wide area networks. However, the hosts, as well as the net-
works, are exposed to intrusions due to the vulnerabilities of network devices and net-
work protocols. The TCP/IP protocol can be also exploited by network intrusions such
as IP spoong, port scanning and so on. Therefore, network-based systems(23)(24)(25)
detect intrusions using IP package information collected by the network hardware. More
importantly, this type of systems can protect the host machine away from attacks, as
their detection occurs before the data arrives at the machine. And it also can detect
the attacks missed by host-based intrusion detection systems.
1.3 Literature Review
Intrusion detection(4)(26)(27) has been developing for over 20 years since D. E. Den-
ning rst proposed intrusion detection as a dierent notion of security in computer
system(28). In this historical process, the researchers have proposed and implemented
various techniques(29)(30)(20)(31) in this eld. Early works on intrusion detection
was due to Anderson(32) and Denning(28). Since then, it has become a very ac-
tive eld. There has been steadily growing interest in research and development of
IDS. The main goal was to create a system capable of detecting dierent kinds of at-
tacks. To accomplish this goal, researchers have been exploring various approaches
such as Pattern Matching(33)(34), Statistical Models(35)(36), Information Theoretic
measures(37), Data Mining(38)(39), Immune System(40) and Machine Learning(41)(42)(43)
etc.. The intent of the followings is to give a brief overview of recent intrusion detection
approaches on some of these elds.
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1.3.1 Statistical Modeling
Statistical Modeling(35)(36)(44)(45) is one of the earliest methods used for anomaly
detection. It measures the user and system behavior by a number of variables sam-
pled over time, and builds proles based on the variables of normal behaviors. The
actual variables are then compared against the proles, and deviations are considered
abnormal.
There are many statistical techniques(46). Denning(28) proposed a statistics models
for intrusion detection. According to audit data, the variables were represented as dif-
ferent metrics. Then, to describe the proles of variables, a serious of statistical models
were built, including mean and standard deviation, multivariate model, Markov process
model and time series model. But, these methods construct too simple models leading
to worse discrimination. The next generation intrusion detection expert system is the
representative IDS based on statistics, which measures the similarity between long-
term behaviors and short-term behaviors of the systems for intrusion detection(47).
(48) examined the application of Statistical Trac Modeling for detecting novel at-
tacks against computer networks. In this method, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics was
used to model and detect DoS as well as probing attacks. Ye et.al.(49) developed an
anomaly detection technique, where the norm prole of temporal behaviors learns the
Markov chain model from computer connection data, and detects anomalies based on
the Markov chain model of temporal behaviors. However, this method could not pro-
vide accurate classication since various features of the connection level are ignored.
The multiple linear regression analysis which is one of multivariate statistical analysis
methods was used in (50) to analyze network trac. But, it is not suitable to express
an attack using the linear model since it may be nonlinear.
In short, these approaches in anomaly detection require the construction of a model
for normal user behaviour, and any user behaviour that deviates signicantly from this
normal behaviour is agged as an intrusion. It can also be dicult to determine the
correct anomaly threshold at which behaviour is to be considered an intrusion. Also,
to apply statistical techniques, too many assumption conditions are needed, which may
contradict the facts.
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1.3.2 Supervised Learning Approaches
Supervised learning is the machine learning task of building a model using labeled
training data.
Naive Bayes classier(51) is composed of Directed Acyclic Graph(DAG) which is
trained as well as Conditional Probability Table(CPT) by the training connection data.
Then, it is possible to classify any new data with its attributes' values using the Bayes
rules based on the quantied network structure. However, Naive Bayes classier makes
a strong independence relation assumption between features when the features are
correlated.
S. Mukkamal et.al(52) implemented Support Vector Machine(SVM) to classify new
connection data into normal and intrusion by mapping real valued input feature vec-
tors to a higher dimensional feature space. It has the advantage of dealing with high
dimensionality of data. But, the performance of SVM approach lies in the choice of the
kernel, which makes it dicult to deal with large scale database.
Neural networks are also used to realize IDS in many researches(53). They are
algorithmic techniques(54)(55) which are used to rst learn the relationship among
information and then generalize to obtain new input-output pairs in a reasonable way.
Multi Layer Perceptron(MLP) is a feed forward articial neural network model that
maps the set of input data into the set of appropriate outputs(56). A MLP consists
of multiple layers of nodes in a directed graph, with each layer being connected fully
to the next layer. In (57), MLP is the basic unite of the ensemble classiers. In this
way, the dierent sources of information are integrated with each other, which is called
data fusion. Although the neural networks can work eectively with noisy data, they
require a large amount of data for the training and it is often hard to select the best
architecture for the neural networks. Adaboost is an important method of ensemble
learning. It is a stereotype algorithm of boosting, whose basic idea is to select and
combine a group of weak classiers to form a strong classier(58). But, a group of weak
classiers is required to be designed beforehand. In(20), weak classier is constructed
by the decision stump which is a decision tree with a root node and two leaf nodes.
However, the performance of Adaboost algorithm always relies on the weak classiers.
In addition, it is easily inuenced by noises.
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1.3.3 Unsupervised learning Approaches
In machine learning, unsupervised learning refers to the problem of trying to nd
hidden structure in unlabeled data. Data clustering is a main type of unsupervised
methods, such as K-means and fuzzy c-means(59)(60). One of the main drawbacks of
the clustering technique is that it is based on calculating the numeric distance between
the observations, hence the observations must be numeric. Observations with symbolic
features cannot be easily used for clustering, which result in inaccuracy. In addition,
the clustering methods consider the features independent and are unable to capture
the relationship among dierent features of a single record, which further degrades the
detection accuracy of the attacks.
A self-organizing map (SOM), also known as Kohonen map, is a typical unsuper-
vised neural network based on competitive learning. It can organize and train the
structure of neural networks by itself. Except input layer and output layer, it has a
competitive layer. Hoglund et al.(61) extract features that describe network behaviors
from audit data, and they use the SOM to detect intrusions. Kayacik et al.(62) propose
a hierarchical SOM approach for intrusion detection. Specic attention is given to the
hierarchical development of abstractions, which is sucient to permit direct labeling of
SOM nodes with connection type.
1.3.4 Data Mining Approaches
Data mining approaches generally discover relevant patterns of programs and user be-
haviors, which are mainly in the form of rules or frequent episodes. Lee et. al(63)
develop a data mining framework MADAM ID (Mining Audit Data for Automated
Models for Intrusion Detection) for mining audit data to discover useful frequent pat-
terns and association rules. In this approach, the learned rules replace the manually
encoded intrusion patterns and proles. PIPPER, a rule learning tool, has been used
for automatic construction of the detection models in MADAM ID. ADAM(Audit Data
Analysis and Mining)(64) uses a frequent itemset-based association rule mining algo-
rithm in detection as an online network-based IDS. The framework of ADAM has two
phases: training phase and on-line phase. In the training phase, the attack-free training
data is fed to a module whose output is a rule-based prole of normal activities. After
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that, the produced prole is input to another module to perform a dynamic on-line
algorithm with association rules.
Some approaches belonging to Soft Computing(SC) are used to nd rules from
either host audit data or network trac. Generally speaking, SC is a methodology
that provides exible information processing capability for handling real-life ambiguous
situations(65). Since its features of exibility and adaptability in new environments and
ability of generalizing from training data, it can be widely used in IDS.
Fuzzy set theory(54) is a mathematical technique for dealing with imprecise data
and problems with many solutions. It can deal with continuous attributes and handle
sharp boundary problems, whose advantages make the rules more comprehensible for
humans. (66) proposed Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine(FIRE), which is a network-
based intrusion detection system that uses fuzzy system to assess malicious activity
against computer networks. This system uses agent to perform its own fuzzication of
input data sources. At the end, all agents communicate with a fuzzy evaluation engine
that combines the results of individual agents using fuzzy rules to produce alerts that
are true to a degree. A. Tajbakhsh et. al(67) discover fuzzy association rules to build
the classier. In this approach, a set of fuzzy association rules is extracted for each
class. In order to determine the label of a new connection data, the similarity of the
extracted rules to the new connection data is calculated.
As to Evolutionary Computation, Genetic Algorithm(GA)(68) is referred rstly. In
IDSs, GA can be used to evolve simple rules for either host audit data or network trac.
Besides, GA is a good tool for feature selection(69)(70)(71)(70) or model selection(71).
In this sense, GA is also used to nd the suitable fuzzy membership functions(72).
The nal best set of fuzzy membership functions in all populations is gathered to be
used for mining fuzzy association rules. However, most of rule mining approaches
tend to produce a large number of rules that increase the complexity of the system.
In order to solve this problem, many rule pruning methods are proposed. One well
known research direction is to remove redundant rules using the concepts of closed
item sets(73) and representative rules(74). In (75), an algorithm taking advantage of
upward closure properties of weak rules is proposed to nd a small subset of a class
association rule set. And the clustering of association rules has been also used to obtain
a reasonable set of rules(76). But, most of the algorithms need users' information on
the complete rule set. Genetic Programming (GP) has been also applied to intrusion
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detection. GP ensemble(77) applies cellular GP to create classiers, which creates
some independent decision trees based on dierent training data and they are nally
combined to form the intrusion detection system. On the other hand, Genetic Network
Programming (GNP)(78) has been proposed as an extension of Genetic Algorithm
and Genetic Programming(GP). GNP-based data mining has been already applied to
intrusion detection systems. The basic framework of IDS using GNP is described in
(30) where fuzzy class association rule mining is developed and misuse detection and
anomaly detection are realized. Then, Fuzzy set theory is induced into GNP to propose
the Fuzzy GNP to extract class association rules and misuse detection and anomaly
detection are integrated to propose a hybrid intrusion detection system(79).
1.4 Motivations and Contributions of the Thesis
By observing the drawbacks of other methods, data mining as descriptive method is
still a safe and ecient method(74). The main theme of the proposed approach is
to apply data mining algorithms to extract rules from data, which accurately capture
the actual behavior of various intrusions and normal activities. From this view, the
framework of the proposed intrusion detection systems mainly contain three parts: rule
mining, rule pruning and classication.
1.4.1 Building a Hybrid Framework for Intrusion Detection System
Traditional misuse detection and anomaly detection have advantages and disadvan-
tages. Misuse detection is eective to the intrusions seen previously. Whereas, anomaly
detection is eective to the intrusions never seen before. In reality, a new produced
connection can be normal, known intrusion or unknown intrusion. Therefore, a hybrid
system is needed to detect known intrusions and unknown intrusions simultaneously
by combining misuse detection and anomaly detection.
In this hybrid framework, a new matching measure is proposed to evaluate how
much a data matches with the rules in dierent classes. It is named as average matching
degree. Dierent from classical method using the highest condential rule, each rule can
contribute to the nal classication. More importantly, the multi-dimensional problem
can be projected into a two dimensional average matching degree space in the case of
intrusion detection.
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1.4.2 Using GNP to Extract Class Association Rules for Intrusion
Detection
Association rule mining is one of the most popular methods in data mining. Dierent
with association rules, the consequent parts of the class association rules are represented
as class labels. Therefore, class association rules are much more appropriate to apply
to classication problems than association rules. Both of them can be used to discover
various of associations among the attributes. Furthermore, class association rules has
the ability to discover the correlation between the set of attributes and class labels.
Intrusion detection systems mainly aim at classifying each new connection record into
normal or intrusions. So a class association rule mining method is used in the proposed
intrusion detection systems.
Evolution algorithms such as GA and GP have been applied to automatically extract
rules. GA evolve the association rules during generations. Each rule is encoded as
an individual. Thus, GA only evolves a small number of useful rules which is not
enough to build the model. GP is an evolution algorithm with tree structure which has
high interpretability. But the tree structure brings some problems which reduce the
eciency of the algorithm. As an extend algorithm of GA and GP, Genetic Network
Programming(GNP) has the unique directed structure which solves the bloat problem
of GP. The characteristic of reusability nodes can extract a large number of rules during
generations. Besides, one GNP individual contains one start node, plural processing
nodes and judgment nodes. Each attribute in the data set corresponds to a judgment
node. The connections of judgment nodes in the directed graph form the antecedent
association parts of rules. Processing nodes work as the starting points of extracting
rules. Meanwhile, these rules have been labeled classes. In addition, both the node
transitions and the node functions of GNP can be evolved during generations, which
also contributes to extracting diversied class association rules for intrusion detection.
When a rule mining method is used, it is ecient to deal with binary attributes of
data set. As to quantitative attributes, traditional methods simply partitioned them
into two or more intervals. But, these methods result in information loss. Even though
the utilization of information gain-based sub-attributes can reduce such loss as much as
possible, the discretization of the quantitative attributes would lead to underestimate
or overestimate the values that are near the borders. Then, a sharp boundary problem
comes out. Fuzzy set theory is helpful to solve this problem. Therefore, Fuzzy GNP is
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proposed in this thesis. Fuzzy set theory can assist GNP to extract the rule by allowing
dierent degrees of memberships. At the same time, GNP can evolve fuzzy membership
functions during generations to extract more rules.
In general, Fuzzy GNP(79) has the following advantages:
 The class association rules are generated automatically with the evolution of
GNP without domain knowledge.
 The sharp boundary problem can be also avoided. This problem comes from
the discretization of the continuous attributes into intervals, which lead to under or
overestimate the values that are near borders.
 The probabilistic node transition of Fuzzy GNP contributes to obtain the
diversied rules.
 Each continuous attribute has its own fuzzy membership function. All of the
fuzzy membership functions are evolved with GNP evolution.
1.4.3 Pruning Class Association Rules for Intrusion Detection
Dierent with the frequent item set-based rule mining method which extracts complete
set of rules for historic data set, class association rule mining aims to discover an
sucient number of rules for each class. Even though the aims of both rule mining are
dierent, they all have the ability to extract a large number of rules.
Both association rule mining and class association rule mining take support, con-
dence or 2 to extract rules. In order to reduce the number of extracted rules, some
methods simply improve the criteria such as large minimum support value. In this
case, this small set of rules results in overtting problem. The smaller minimum val-
ues of support, condence and 2 ensure that many useful rules can be extracted. A
large number of class association rules leads to lower eciency. Simultaneously, many
redundant and irrelevant information are contained in the large number of rules. There-
fore, pruning rules is necessary to improve the eciency and detection performance of
intrusion detection systems.
The proposed rule pruning method in this thesis contains the following advantages.
 In this approach, the analysis of each is not needed. Genetic Algorithm is used
to automatically delete the rule which has bad performance.
 Two stages are used. In the rst stage, the rule whose average matching degree
with data is lower than a threshold, it is regarded as redundant in the rst stage. In
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the second stage, GA picks up the eective rules among the remaining rules in the rst
stage.
 The approach also considers the balance of the four evaluation standards.
1.4.4 Building Classication Models for Intrusion Detection
It is important to build ecient classication models for intrusion detection. As the
component of an intrusion detection system, a classication model should classify each
new connection record into normal, misuse intrusion or anomaly intrusion. Many re-
searchers have tried to utilize various algorithms to build a classication model, which
can work in both misuse detection and anomaly detection. However, it is hard to build
a unique classication model. The reasons are described as follows. The automatically
produced intrusions from Internet may obey a specic distribution. Whereas, it is di-
cult to nd the restricted distribution of intrusions that are manually made. Besides, it
is not easy to distinguish normal and anomaly intrusions. Distance is a direct measure
to make classication. Distance-based classication method has no unique model. And
it has obvious features like it can execute with considering few parameters. To improve
the detection performance, it is critical to identify anomaly intrusions from normal and
misuse intrusions. Anomaly intrusions are those attacks never seen previously. Only
using the patterns of normal cannot identify anomaly intrusions exactly. Making full
use of both normal and misuse intrusions can help to improve the detection of anomaly
intrusions. Then, the data and its K-closest neighbors could be regarded as a cluster of
similar network behaviors. Thus, if the boundary of each cluster of the similar network
behaviors is found, it is easy to distinguish a new connection record. In this thesis, two
classication methods are proposed to improve the detection performance. The later
one is the modication of the distance-based approach.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 builds a hybrid framework of
GNP-based class association rule mining for intrusion detection utilizing the advantages
of both misuse detection and anomaly detection. Chapter 3 introduces how to prune
the class association rules using Genetic Algorithms. The simulation results on pro-
posed rule pruning method outperform those without rule pruning. Chapter 4 proposes
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the class association rule mining using Fuzzy GNP. And the simulations demonstrate
that Fuzzy GNP is ecient to extract sucient diversied rules for intrusion detec-
tion. Chapter 5 proposes a classication algorithm using the distance between the new
data and its closest points of classes. Chapter 6 proposes an improved classication
approach which uses Gaussian functions to look for the boundary of each cluster of
network behaviors and to identify the data as normal, misuse intrusions and anomaly
intrusions. The simulations on the benchmark data set demonstrate the improvement
of detection comparing with the basic method, Distance-based method and other state
of art methods. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the thesis.
1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the problems in computer security were described, which proved that it
is urgent to build a reliable intrusion detection system. Then, the taxonomy of intrusion
detection was introduced and the advantages and disadvantages of two general intrusion
detection techniques were discussed, too. Next, various approaches applied in intrusion
detection were presented. When describing the approaches used for intrusion detection
systems, their underlying assumptions and their strengths and limitations were also
discussed. More importantly, a general introduction was given on the motivations and
contributions to this thesis. Finally, how to evaluate the detection ability was explained.
In the following chapters, the proposed methods are introduced in detail and the
simulation results are given on benchmark data sets.
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2A Hybrid Framework of
Intrusion Detection System using
Genetic Network Programming
Generally speaking, misuse intrusion detection is ecient to identify misuse intrusions
from the mixture data set of normal and misuse intrusions. But it cannot detect un-
known attacks without any pre-collected patterns(80). On the other hand, an anomaly-
based system uses dierent philosophy. It treats any network connection violating the
normal prole as an anomaly(81)(82)(83). A network anomaly intrusion is revealed
if the incoming connection deviates from the normal proles signicantly. But it is
easy to classify normal as anomaly resulting in many false alarms. Therefore, a new
intrusion detection system is proposed in this chapter to utilize the positive features of
misuse intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection.
2.1 Introduction
Various data mining approaches have been proposed and implemented to detect in-
trusions in computer security. ADAM(Audit Data Analysis and Mining)(84) uses a
frequent itemset-based association rule mining algorithm in detection as an online
network-based IDS. The framework of ADAM has two phases: training phase and on-
line phase. In the training phase, the attack-free training data is fed to a module whose
output is a rule-based prole of normal activities. After that, the produced prole is
inputed to another module to perform a dynamic on-line algorithm with association
rules. The next-generation intrusion detection expert system(NIDES)(11) performs a
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real-time monitoring of user activities on multiple-target systems connected on a net-
work. It consists of a misuse detection component as well as an anomaly detection
component. The misuse detection component employs expert rules to dene misuse
intrusive activities. And anomaly detection component is based on the statistical ap-
proach, and it labels activities as attacks if they are largely deviant from the expected
behaviors. (24) also proposed an approach to combine the advantages of misuse and
anomaly detection. A random forests algorithm is employed in misuse detection to de-
tect misuse intrusions. Then, they used the outlier detection provided by the random
forests algorithm to detect anomaly intrusions.
In this chapter, a new intrusion detection system is proposed to combine the ad-
vantages of misuse intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection. As a rule
generator, Genetic Network Programming(GNP) is used to extract enough number of
class association rules for intrusion detection. Dierent from the popular rule mining
method Apriori, it is an evolutionary algorithm and automatically extracts the class
association rules in evolution.
The features of the GNP-based intrusion detection system compared with other
intrusion detection systems are as follows.
1. One of the features is that both normal and misuse intrusion rules are extracted
by evolving GNP individuals, which ensures the diversity and quantity of rules.
2. The other is that the mean and standard deviation of the average matching
degrees are used to build the classier which can distinguish normal, misuse in-
trusion and anomaly intrusion connections simultaneously, which ensures the full
usage of the relation between data and two kinds of rules.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the motivations are presented in
Section 2.2. Then, KDD Cup 1999 data set used in the experiments is described in
Section 2.3. The framework of the intrusion detection system is introduced in 2.4.
The simulations are conducted on KDD Cup 1999 data set in Section 2.5. Finally, the
conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6.
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Conventionally, intrusion detection techniques are divided into misuse intrusion detec-
tion and anomaly intrusion detection. Misuse intrusion detection focuses on detect-
ing known intrusion types by matching the patterns of known intrusion types, while
anomaly intrusion detection looks for the new observations which deviate from known
normal patterns. Therefore, it is easy to misclassify normal and new intrusion types,
since new types of intrusions always pretend to be normal behaviors to attack computer
systems. And the detection of new intrusion types becomes dicult in misuse intrusion
detection, since no patters about new types of intrusions is contained in this kind of
system. Combining the two kinds of techniques in a system makes it possible to remedy
the defects of two dierent techniques by making full use of known information.
On the other hand, most of the intrusion detection systems detect intrusions by
experts' experiences or rules extracted from historic data. As one of the most popular
data mining methods for many applications, association rule mining is used to discover
associations or correlations among a set of attributes in data set. In order to discover
useful rules from a dense database, genetic algorithm and genetic programming have
been applied to association rule mining. GA evolves the rules during generations and
individuals or population themselves represent the association relationships. However,
it is not easy for GA to extract enough number of useful rules, because a rule is usually
represented as an individual of GA. GP improves the interpretability of GA by replac-
ing the gene structures with the tree structures, which enables higher representation
ability of association rules. However, due to the characteristic of tree representations,
some problems are commonly experienced, such as code bloat, destructive crossover
and structural diculties. As an extended evolutionary algorithm of GA and GP, ge-
netic network programming (GNP) can represent its solutions using directed graph
structures. Owing to this feature, GNP can evolve without the bloat problem of GP. In
addition, the advantage of GNP applied to rule mining is that it can extract a sucient
number of useful rules for user's purpose rather than to extract all the rules meeting
the criteria. Like most of the existing association rule mining algorithms, conventional
association rule mining based on GNP is able to extract rules with attributes of binary
values. However, in real world applications, database are more likely to be composed
of both discrete and continuous values.
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The simulations are conducted on the benchmark KDD Cup 1999 intrusion data set(85).
Since 1999, this data set has been the most widely used data set for the evaluation
of intrusion detection methods. This data set is prepared by Stolfo et al.(86) and
is built based on the data captured in 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation
program, prepared and managed by the MIT Lincoln Labs. Lincoln Labs set up an
environment to acquire raw TCP dump data of nine weeks from a local-area network
(LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. Thus, the 1998 DARPA data set
contains about 4 gigabytes of compressed raw(binary) tcpdump data of 7 weeks of the
network trac for training, which can be processed into about 5 million connection
records. Similarly, the test data of two weeks is around 2 million connection records.
Stolfo et al. dened higher-level features that help in distinguishing normal con-
nections from attacks for the 1998 DARPA data set and pre-processed it. Therefore,
KDD Cup 1999 data set contains about ve million connection records as the training
data and about two million connection records as the testing data. Each record in the
data set represents a connection between two IP addresses, starting and ending at some
well dened times with a well dened protocol. Further, with 41 dierent attributes,
every record represents a separate connection. Hence, in my experiments, every record
is considered to be independent each other.
The training data is either labeled as normal or as one of the 24 dierent kinds
of attacks. All of the 24 attacks can be grouped into one of the four classes; Probe,
DenialofService (DoS), unauthorized access from a remote machine orRemotetoLocal
(R2L) and unauthorized access to root or UsertoRoot (U2R).
Probing is an attempt to gather information about a network of computers for the
apparent purpose of circumventing its security controls.
DoS is a type of attacks in which the attacker makes some computing or memory
resource too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests, or denies legitimate users
access to a machine.
R2L occurs when an attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine over a
network but who does not have an account on that machine exploits some vulnerability
to gain local access as a user of that machine.
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U2R is a class of exploit in which the attacker starts out with access to a normal
user account on the system (perhaps gained by sning passwords, a dictionary attack,
or social engineering) and is able to exploit some vulnerability to gain root access to
the system.
Similarly, the testing data is also labeled as either normal or as one of the attacks
belonging to the four attack classes. It is important to note that the testing data
includes specic attacks which are not included in the training data. This makes the
intrusion detection task more realistic(85).
2.4 Class Association Rule Mining and Classication
The proposed hybrid framework generally combines misuse detection and anomaly de-
tection. It can detect misuse intrusions and anomaly intrusions simultaneously. This
hybrid intrusion detection system in this chapter contains the two basic components:
rule mining and classication. In the rule mining, GNP is used to extract enough class
association rules from normal data and misuse intrusion(known intrusion) data. A
brand new intrusion should deviate from normal patterns and dierentiate from mis-
use intrusions. Only considering normal patters is not enough to evaluate whether
a new connection is anomaly or not. In the classication, the average matching de-
gree is used to project multi-dimensional network connections into a two dimensional
space by extracted normal and misuse intrusion rules. Therefore, the combination
of misuse detection classier and anomaly detection classier is named hybrid classi-
er/classication.
2.4.1 Sub-Attribute Utilization
Network connections can be represented as a combination of serious features which are
mainly divided into discrete ones and continuous ones. The features which are also
called attributes usually with two or more possible values, especially for continuous
attributes. Therefore, it is important to select an appropriate partition for continuous
attributes and ensure the information loss as little as possible simultaneously. In GNP-
based class association rule mining, the information gain is utilized to calculate the
threshold to maximize the information gain. Then, continuous attribute is split into
two sub-attributes depending on whether the value is larger than a threshold or smaller
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than the threshold like the example in Fig. 2.1. In Fig. 2.1, by dening a threshold value
for continuous attribute "Count", two sub-attributes are obtained. In class association
rule mining, the real value of "Count" is compared with the threshold. "larger than"
or "equal to" means it should be the rst attribute A1, while "smaller than" means it
belongs to the second attribute A2.
Figure 2.1: Sub-attribute utilization of continuous attributes
In addition, discrete attributes can be divided into binary ones and categorical ones.
For binary attribute, it has only two possible values which are 0 and 1. Thus, it has
two sub-attributes corresponding to 0 and 1. For categorical attributes, they have
two or more possible values such as the attribute which is used to mark the type of
network protocal. Such kind of attributes does not consider the relationship since the
dierent values are independent with each other. Therefore, according to the dierent
values, it is partitioned into several sub-attributes. Fig. 2.2 shows the cases of discrete
attributes. In Fig. 2.2, the binary attribute Land has two possible values of "0" and "1".
Therefore, it is divided into two sub-attributes before mining class association rules.
Whereas, "Protocal type" is a categorical attribute which has more than two possible
values. If it only has three possible values, it will be divided into three sub-attributes.
Figure 2.2: Sub-attribute utilization of discrete attributes
2.4.2 Class Association Rule Mining using GNP
An association rule is represented as X ) Y , where X and Y are the item sets. This
rule means that if the items in X exist in a transaction, then Y is also in the transaction
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Table 2.1: An example of data set with boolean variables
TID A1 A2 A3 A4 C
1 1 0 1 0 0
2 0 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 0 1
4 0 1 0 1 1
with high probability. Class association rule is an association rule whose consequent
part is restricted to a given class label. GNP-based class association rule mining is rst
proposed by K. Shimada(87) to do data mining on the data set with boolean variables.
Table 2.1 shows an example of data set with boolean variables.
Let Ai be an item in data set and its value be 1 or 0, and C be the class label. TID
means the identication number of the tuples in data set. A class association rule can
be represented in the following:
(Ap = 1) ^ ::: ^ (Aq = 1)) (C = k); (k = 0; 1; 2; :::;K): (2.1)
Figure 2.3: GNP-based class association rule mining for boolean variables
GNP examines the attribute values of tuples of data set using judgment nodes and
calculates the measurements of association rules using processing nodes. Judgment
node determines the next node by a judgment result of Yes or No corresponding Yes-
side or No-side as shown in Fig. 2.3. In addition, each judgment node examines the
corresponding class label at the same time. Yes-side of the judgment node is connected
to another judgment node. Judgment nodes can be reused and shared with other
association rules because of GNP's characteristic. No-side of the judgment node is
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connected to another processing node, which represents the end of this rule and the
start of another new rule. The start node is connected to the rst processing node.
The fundamental dierence from the evolutionary way of other evolutionary algo-
rithms is that GNP individuals extract interesting rules by evolution and store all the
new interesting rules into a pool through the generations(87).
In the extraction of the class association rules for intrusion detection, the attributes
and their values correspond to judgement nodes and their judgement values in GNP, re-
spectively. With the sub-attribute utilization, GNP-based class association rule mining
successfully combines discrete and continuous values in one single rule. Fig. 2.4 shows
an example that GNP extracts candidate class association rules. P1 is a processing
node, which serves as a starting point of class association rule mining and connects to
a judgement node. The Yes-side of a judgement node is connected to another judge-
ment node, while the No-side is connected to the next processing node. Judgement
nodes here are corresponding to the sub-attributes including both discrete and contin-
uous ones. Taking the above as an example, judgement node A1 represents the value
of the continuous attribute count which is greater than or equal to threshold thred; A3
represents the value of the binary attribute Land which equals to 0; and A6 represents
the type of the categorical attribute Protocal which belongs to icmp in the current
generation. The total number of tuples moving to Yes-side at each judgement node
Figure 2.4: GNP representation of class association rules
is calculated at each processing node, which is a start point for class association rule
mining.
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Table 2.2: Support and confidence of class association rules
Class Association Rules support confidence
A1 ) Normal aN=N aN=a
A1 ) Intrusion aI=N aI=a
A1 ^A3 ) Normal bN=N bN=b
A1 ^A3 ) Intrusion bI=N bI=b
A1 ^A3 ^A6 ) Normal cN=N cN=c
A1 ^A3 ^A6 ) Intrusion cI=N cI=c
In Fig. 2.4, N is the number of total tuples. a, b and c are the number of tuples
moving to Yes-side at each judgement node. aN , bN and cN are the number of tuples
moving to Yes-side at each judgement node which belong to normal class. And aI ,
bI and cI are those belonging to misuse intrusion class in the application of intrusion
detection. Based on the above numbers, the criteria of support, confidence and 2
can be calculated. Table 2.2 shows how to calculate support and confidence values of
class association rules. For a rule with the form of X ) Y , the 2 are calculated by
support(X) = x, support(Y ) = y and support(X [ Y ) = z in Eq. 2.2, where, X is the
antecedent part of the rule which is represented as a set of attributes and values, and Y
is the consequent part of the rule which is represented as class label in class association
rule mining.
2 =
N(z   xy)2
xy(1  x)(1  y) : (2.2)
The important rules should satisfy the minimum value of support, confidence and
2. The supportmin, confidencemin and 
2
min are given by designers. When an im-
portant rule is extracted by GNP, it is checked whether the important rule is new or
not. Here, we use supportmin = 0:1, confidencemin = 0:8 and 
2
min = 6:64 to select
important class association rules.
After that, the GNP individuals are evaluated by the tness dened in the following.
F =
X
r2R
f2(r) + 10(nante(r)  1) + new(r)g; (2.3)
where R is the set of suxes of extracted important class association rules in a GNP
individual, 2(r) is chi-square of rule r, nante(r) is the number of attributes of the
antecedent of rule r and new(r) is a constant if rule r is new, otherwise it is 0.
Similar to other evolutionary methods, the structures of GNP are evolved by per-
forming genetic operators. First, the best 1=3 individuals are selected in terms of the
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tness values to do crossover and mutation(87). Two parents selected by tournament
selection do crossover and generate two ospring. In detail, each node in parent indi-
viduals is selected as a crossover node with the probability of Pc. Then, two parents
exchange the genes of the corresponding crossover nodes. Finally, the generated in-
dividuals become new ones in the next generation. Whereas, mutation is executed in
one individual selected by tournament selection. Two kinds of mutation operators are
used in GNP-based class association rule mining. Each branch is selected with the
probability of Pm1 and connected to another node and each node function is selected
with the probability of Pm2 and changed to another one.
The owchart of class association rule mining using GNP is shown in Fig. 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Flowchart of GNP-based class association rule mining
2.4.3 Matching Measure using Average Matching Degree
Another distinct dierence between the proposed method and other rule-based meth-
ods is that a two dimensional space is formed by matching the data with rules. In most
of rule-based classication approaches(88)(89)(90)(10), the rules are exploited as de-
scriptive models of dierent classes. Conventional methods always use a voting scheme
to classify a new data according to the classier which is based on the nite set of
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potential rules chosen by a kind of coverage mechanism. The label of the new data
corresponds to the best matched rule. While this thesis utilizes a measure to evaluate
how well a new data is matched with the rules in each class. Then, a classication
model can be built based on the average matching degree space.
Before calculating the average matching degree of training data d with all the rules
in each classes, the matching degree of training data d with each rule r in class k is
dened as follow:
Matchk(d; r) =
Nk(d; r)
Nk(r)
; (2.4)
where, Nk(d; r) is the number of matched attributes of data d with the antecedent part
of rule r in class k, k 2 fnormal;misuse intrusiong. Nk(r) is the number of attributes
in the antecedent part of rule r in class k. If Matchk(d; r) equals to 1:0, rule r matches
with training data d completely, while, Matchk(d; r) equals to 0, rule r does not match
with training data d at all. Then, the average matching degree of training data d with
all the rules in class k of the rule pool is dened as follow.
mk(d) =
1
j Rk j
X
r2Rk
Matchk(d; r); (2.5)
mk(d) is the average matching degree of training data d with all the rules in class
k. Rk denotes the set of suxes of rules in class k.
2.4.4 Classication Combining Misuse Detection and Anomaly De-
tection using Average Matching Degree
Once the multi-dimensional connection data is projected into a two dimensional space,
many classication methods can be implemented. In order to compare the detection
performances of the proposed hybrid framework and those of the conventional GNP-
based misuse detection and GNP-based anomaly detection, the Mean and Standard
Deviation Model is used to make the classication.
After obtaining the average matching degree between training data and the rules
in class k, we can obtain mean  and standard deviation  of the distribution of mk(d)
over all the training data in class k as shown in Eq. 2.6 and Eq. 2.7, respectively.
k =
1
j Dk j
X
d2Dk
mk(d); (2.6)
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k =
s
1
jDkj
X
d2Dk
(mk(d)  k)2; (2.7)
where, Dk is the set of suxes of training data in class k. Fig. 2.6 shows one example
of the distribution.
k
?
k
?
average matching degree
0 1
Figure 2.6: An example of mean and standard deviation values of the average matching
degree
Now, we have two kinds of means and standard deviations, those are, N and N
from normal training data and normal rules, and I and I from misuse training data
and misuse intrusion rules, respectively. Fig. 2.7 shows the main idea of the proposed
classication method. The horizontal ordinate represents the average matching degree
of testing data dnew with normal rules, while the vertical ordinate represents the average
matching degree of testing data dnew with misuse intrusion rules. In the testing period,
when a new testing data dnew comes, the average matching degree of the new testing
data with the rules in the normal rule pool and misuse intrusion rule pool are calculated
as mN (dnew) and mI(dnew). Then,
if mN (dnew)  N   kNN and mI(dnew)  I   kII then
dnew is anomaly intrusion
else
if mN (dnew)  mI(dnew) then
dnew is normal
else
dnew is misuse intrusion
end if
end if
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Figure 2.7: Classication combining misuse detection and anomaly detection using
average matching degree
Here, kN and kI are two parameters that can be adjusted so as to distinguish
normal, misuse intrusion and anomaly intrusion for better performance.
The conventional GNP-based misuse detection method classies the normal con-
nection and misuse intrusion connection by comparing mN (dnew) (average matching
degree of testing data dnew with normal rules) and mI(dnew)(average matching degree
of testing data dnew with misuse rules). If mN (dnew)  mI(dnew), testing data dnew is
labeled as normal, otherwise, it belongs to misuse intrusions.
However, the conventional GNP-based anomaly detection method carries the GNP-
based class association rule mining on normal network behaviors and detects new intru-
sions by evaluating signicant deviations from the normal behaviors. After calculating
mean value N and standard deviation N of the distribution of the average matching
degree between normal training data with normal rules, if mN (dnew)  N   k0NN is
satised, testing data dnew is labeled as normal, otherwise, dnew belongs to anomaly
intrusion.
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Table 2.3: Parameters of GNP-based rule extraction
Population Size 120
Generation 1000
Processing Node 10
Judgment Node 100
Crossover Rate 1=5
Mutation Rate1 1=3
Mutation Rate2 1=3
2.5 Simulations
2.5.1 Training Simulations
Using GNP to extract class association rules, the parameters of GNP are set as shown
in Table 2.3. In the training step, a sucient number of data for GNP are prepared to
eciently extract rules. The training data contains 8068 connections randomly selected
from KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection data set, among which 4116 connections are
normal and 3952 connections are misuse intrusion including two kinds of attacks, smurf
and neptune, respectively. smurf and neptune are the misuse intrusion types with the
rst and second largest numbers in the original database, respectively.
In KDD Cup 1999 database, 41 features are included. After the sub-attribute
utilization, 165 sub-attributes are assigned to the judgment functions in GNP. As a
result of the evolution, 48; 069 rules including 43; 342 normal rules and 4; 727 misuse
intrusion rules are extracted. Fig. 2.8 shows the total number of extracted rules vs.
generation.
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Figure 2.8: Total number of extracted rules by GNP
27
2.5 Simulations
2.5.2 Testing Simulations
In this simulation, we carry out experiments to verify the eectiveness of the proposed
intrusion detection using GNP.
The testing data contains 748 unlabel normal connections and 320 unlabeled intru-
sion connections. The testing results are given in Table 2.4. In Table 2.4, Normal(C),
Misuse(C) and Anomaly(C) indicate the number of normal, misuse intrusions and
anomaly intrusions labeled by the basic classier using both misuse detections and
anomaly detections based on the average matching degree, respectively, whileNormal(A),
Misuse(A) and Anomaly(A) indicate the actual number of normal, misuse intrusions
and anomaly intrusions, respectively.
Table 2.4: Classication results of the proposed intrusion detection system
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 715 11 22 748
Misuse(A) 0 188 52 240
Anomaly(A) 12 8 60 80
Total 727 207 134 1068
From Table 2.4, DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR of the GNP-based intrusion de-
tection system are calculated as follows:
DR = (715 + 188 + 60 + 8 + 52)=1068 = 95:79%
PFR = (11 + 22)=748 = 4:41%
NFR = (0 + 12)=320 = 3:75%
Accuracy = (715 + 188 + 60)=1068 = 90:17%
On the other hand, the proposed GNP-based intrusion detection system is com-
pared with other methods, that is, the conventional GNP-based misuse detection and
conventional GNP-based anomaly detection. In the conventional GNP-based misuse
detection, only the average matching degrees of a new connection data with normal
rules and misuse intrusion rules are compared. It is too simple to classify the new con-
nections. It can get good performances in a data set without anomaly intrusions. Once
new types of intrusions are coming, it is dicult to defect. In the conventional GNP-
based anomaly detection, it only extracts a pool of normal rules. It has the advantage
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that it uses the mean and standard deviation model on the average matching degrees of
the training data with normal rules. The mean and standard deviation model requires
no priori knowledge about normal activities in order to set thresholds. But only using
normal information without any intrusions result in lower DR, higher PFR and NFR.
Fig. 2.9 shows the DR comparison between the proposed GNP-based intrusion de-
tection system and conventional misuse detection and anomaly detection. In misuse
detection, the intrusion types in the testing database are the same as those in the train-
ing database; while in anomaly detection, the training is an intrusion-free procedure,
thus, all the intrusion types can be regarded as anomaly ones. Fig. 2.10 shows the
comparisons of PFR and NFR of the proposed intrusion detection system with the
conventional misuse detection and anomaly detection.
Figure 2.9: Comparisons of DR between the proposed method and conventional methods
From the simulations, it is shown from Fig. 2.9 and Fig. 2.10 that the conven-
tional GNP-based anomaly detection gets much higher PFR. On the other hand, DR
is improved by the proposed GNP-based combination detection comparing with con-
ventional GNP-based intrusion detection approaches. The proposed method detects
normal, misuse intrusion and anomaly intrusion with higher DR. And the proposed
GNP-based intrusion detection system utilizes the advantages of misuse detection and
anomaly detection by combing these two methods concurrently. Generally, the pro-
posed system improves the detection performance as well as the balancing between
PFR and NFR.
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Figure 2.10: Comparisons of PFR and NFR between the proposed method and con-
ventional methods
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a GNP-based intrusion detection system has been proposed to detect
misuse intrusions and anomaly intrusions at the same time. The proposed GNP-based
intrusion detection system generally consists of class association rule mining and clas-
sication. In class association rule mining, information gain is used to partition the
continuous features into sub-attributes. Besides, the two dimensional average matching
degree space is used to build the classier for the system. By combing the advantages of
misuse detection and anomaly detection, the proposed method has better performances.
However, too many rules bring much useless information into the rule pool in-
evitably. In this case, an ecient pruning method is needed to reduce the useless rules
to improve the eciency of IDS.
On the other hand, the discretization of the continuous attributes into intervals
would lead to underestimate or overestimate the values that are near the borders. This
is called the sharp boundary problem.
Then, we solve the two problems separately in the following two chapters.
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3Intrusion Detection System with
Rule Pruning using Genetic
Network Programming
Class association rule mining is typically known as an important method for data
analysis. However, there is a problem in class association rule mining. Even though
the goal of the class association rule mining is not to extract a complete set of rules,
the number of class association rules extracted is still very large. Therefore, it is
time consuming. Most importantly, the rule pool with a large number of rules usually
contains much redundant, irrelevant and obvious information. On the other hand, there
are two requirements in intrusion detection. One is the real time, the other is detection
ability. This leads to two other issues: how can we reduce the number of rules in the
model and how can we eectively utilize the rules to make the classication? In this
chapter, one of these issues is addressed: the reduction of classication rules. This
problem is challenging because the goal is to prune the useless rules while preventing
the detection performance of the classier from dipping.
3.1 Introduction
Most algorithms mining rules for classication aim at nding sucient rules to cover
the training set, rather than nding all the rules from the training data(91). In class
association rule mining, the values of the support, confidence and 2 are main criteria
to evaluate whether a rule is important or not. If the minimum values of support,
confidence and 2 are set at high values, the number of the class association rules
31
3.1 Introduction
extracted is very small. However, the high values of the support, confidence and
2 result in the overtting problem to the training data. In addition, some of the
important rules with relatively lower values of the support, confidence and 2 cannot
be discovered from training data. In order to extracting useful class association rules,
the minimum values of the support, confidence and 2 should be set at lower values.
Then, much redundant and irrelevant information is included in the huge number of
rules.
To solve the large number of generated rules, dierent methods are conducted on the
topic of rule pruning. One well known research direction is to remove redundant rules
using the concepts(73) of closed item sets and representative rules(74). Some works
are proposed to prune the discovered rules in order to form a rule cover(92). Other
approaches discard rules that are less relevant with respect to statistical parameters
such as the support, confidence, 2 and conviction(93). Genetic Relation Algorithm
(GRA) as an extension of GP and GNP is used to prune class association rules in (94).
It aims at nding dierent class association rules as many as possible by eliminating
similar rules using the tness calculated by the distances among the rules. The distances
among the rules are also calculated by the support values of the rules. However, these
approaches lead to information loss. While the manual alteration of the rules needs
domain expert knowledge, even if it can lead to signicant improvements.
In this chapter, an average matching degree and Genetic Algorithm-based two-
stage rule pruning scheme is proposed to remove unnecessary rules as a post-processing
procedure. In the rst stage, the average matching degree of a data with the rules is
calculated and if it is less than a threshold value, then the rule is pruned because it
is irrelevant. In the second stage, GA picks up the most interesting rules among the
remaining rules in the rst stage. Therefore, a reduced set of class association rules is
obtained and then, the detection performance is used to evaluate its usefulness.
The main advantages of the proposed method are:
1. It is a post-processing method since its input is a large number of class association
rules extracted by GNP.
2. No-prior knowledge from experiences is needed in this two-stage rule pruning
method.
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3. The rst stage is essential in the two-stage rule pruning method because it reduce
the the size of GA in the second stage.
4. It is ecient to prune the redundant rules, at the same time, it improves the
detection performance of IDS.
5. The proposed method has the ability to control PFR and NFR.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives the motivations
of this chapter. The two-stage rule pruning method is described in Section 3.3. Sim-
ulations are conducted on KDD Cup 1999 in Section 3.4. Finally, we conclude the
summary in Section 3.5.
3.2 Motivations
The rule pruning method aims at obtaining the better classication result under a
small number of rules. The redundant rules are from two aspects. Firstly, two rules
are contradictory. For example, two rules such as X ) C1 and X ) C2 have the same
antecedent part with dierent class labels, where X represents the antecedent part of
the rules and C1 and C2 as the consequent parts of the rules mean the class labels of the
rules. They are conict and have no contribution to classication. Secondly, two rules
have dierent generalization levels. Given two rules R1 : X ) C1 and R2 : Y ) C1
with the same class label and X  Y , the antecedent part X of R1 is the subset of
the antecedent part Y of R2 obviously. The general one is kept since longer rules may
introduce some redundant information.
In addition, useless rules result in overlapping in two dimensional average matching
degree space. For example, an obvious rule contains general knowledge. Thus, it is
included in both normal class and intrusion class and always completely matches with
the data. In this case, the utilization of such kind of rules will lead to reducing the
deviation of the average matching degrees of two entirely dierent data.
A lot of methods are proposed to prune the redundant and irrelevant rules. Most
of the current rule pruning methods are generally divided into two categories. One
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category relies on domain knowledge analysis. The category of such methods needs to
examine each rule in rule pool one by one. By deleting or reconstructing, then, the
number of rules is reduced. The other category relies on sorting the rules in terms
of some standards like the support and confidence. But if two rules have the same
antecedent part and identical support and confidence with dierent class labels, they
are contradictory rules and cannot be pruned by this category. In addition, all of these
methods cannot automatically prune rules. Most importantly, they cannot consider the
inuence of the rules to the classication. Therefore, an automatic and ecient rule
pruning method is motivated by the requirement of reducing the inuence of redundant
and irrelevant rules in the rule pool.
3.3 Two-Stage Rule Pruning
The average matching degree and Genetic Algorithm-based class association rule prun-
ing is carried out in two stages. Stage I aims to reduce the gene size of GA of stage
II, while the objective of stage II is to select a small number of eective rules which
improve DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR of the classier using GA.
3.3.1 Stage I: Average Matching Degree based Method
Roughly speaking, the average matching degree of rule r in class k with the validation
data in class k is calculated and if it is less than a threshold value, then the rule is
pruned since it is irrelevant.
The average matching degree of rule r in class k with data in class k can be calculated
by Eq.(3.1).
mk(r) =
1
jDkj
X
d2Dk
Matchk(d; r); (3.1)
Matchk(d; r) =
Nk(d; r)
Nk(r)
; (3.2)
whereMatchk(d; r) is the matching degree of the rule with each validation data in class
k, Nk(d; r) is the number of matched attributes with data d in the antecedent part of
rule r in class k and Nk(r) means the number of attributes in the antecedent part of
rule r in class k. The mean value k and standard deviation k of mk(r) over the rules
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in class k is calculated as follows:
k =
1
jRkj
X
r2Rk
mk(r); (3.3)
k =
s
1
Rk
X
r2Rk
(mk(r)  k)2; (3.4)
Therefore, if the average matching degree mk(r) of rule r with validation data in class
k falls in the region less than k + kp  k, that is, mk(r) < k + kp  k, then rule r is
pruned, because it is regarded as redundant.
3.3.2 Stage II: Genetic Algorithm-based Method
In this stage, the binary-coded GA is introduced for further pruning the remaining
rules in stage I by encoding the rules as its gene. Gene vi(r) represents if rule r is
pruned or not in the following:
vi(r) =
(
1; if rule r is reserved;
0; otherwise:
(3.5)
0 represents that the rule is deleted during rule pruning in stage II, while, 1 rep-
resents that the rule is used in the classication. Each individual in the population
represents a candidate solution for the problem. When evaluating the intrusion detec-
tion system, since DR means the ratio that each connection is classied correctly to
normal, misuse or anomaly intrusion. ACC means the Accuracy which evaluates the
ability to classify the normal connections as normal and the intrusion connections as
misuse intrusion or anomaly intrusion. PFR means the rate of normal data which are
not classied into a normal class and NFR means the rate of intrusion data which are
not classied into an intrusion class, PFR increases when more normal connection data
are labeled as intrusion, while NFR increases when more intrusion connection data are
labeled as normal.
In order to balance these four criteria and get the acceptable DR, Accuracy, PFR
and NFR, the tness function of GA is dened as follows.
F = DR DR+ ACC ACC   PFR  PFR  NFR NFR (3.6)
DR, ACC , PFR and NFR are the coecients of DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR,
which can be scaled to guide GA towards required designs.
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The initial population of candidate solutions is created randomly. Then, the ge-
netic operators are applied to the individuals in each generation to generate the new
population for the next generation.
A: Selection : The selection operation is basically based on the tness value of
each individual. Elite individual is reserved for the next generation, and tournament
selection is also used.
B: Crossover : The crossover operator exchanges the gene information of the two
parents to create two ospring with the probability of pc. The two parents are selected
by tournament selection among four randomly selected individuals. In this GA, we use
the uniform crossover as shown in Fig. 3.1.
Each gene in the ospring is created by copying the gene from one or another parent
chosen by a randomly generated binary crossover mask of the same length as the gene.
When there is 1 in the crossover mask, the gene is copied from the rst parent, and
when there is 0 in the mask, the gene is copied from the second parent.
11001101 01011001
01011000 11001100
Mask
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
Parent 1
Parent 2
Offspring 1
Offspring 2
Figure 3.1: Uniform crossover
C: Mutation : The better individual selected by tournament selection is also mu-
tated by mutation operator. Non-uniform mutation operator is used aiming at reducing
the disadvantage of random mutation(95). The non-uniform mutation is carried out
with mutation rate of pm, where the operator is dened as follows.
If stv =< v1; :::; vi; :::; vm > is a gene at generation t and element vi is selected for
the mutation, then the following st+1v =< v1; :::; v
0
i; :::; vm > is produced,
v0i = mutate(vi;5(t;m)); (3.7)
5(t;m) =
(
b4(t;m)c; if a random digit is 0;
d4(t;m)e; if a random digit is 1; (3.8)
where, mutate(vi; pos) means: mutate the value of the i-th element using the value
of position pos of the gene, m is the length of the gene. 5(t;m) is calculated by
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Table 3.1: Parameters of GNP-based rule extraction
Population Size 120
Generation 1000
Processing Node 10
Judgment Node 100
Crossover Rate 1=5
Mutation Rate1 1=3
Mutation Rate2 1=3
2min 6:64
Supportmin 0:1
Confidencemin 0:8
Eq.(3.8), b4(t;m)c means the largest integer not greater than the value of 4(t;m),
while d4(t;m)e is the smallest integer not less than the value of 4(t;m). The 4(t;m)
is dened as 4(t;m) = m  (1   r(1  tT )b), where r is a random number in (0,1), T is
the maximal generation number, and b is a system parameter determining the degree
of dependency on the generation number. The function 4(t;m) returns a value in the
range of (0;m).
3.4 Simulations
The two-stage rule pruning method is evaluated by carrying out the simulations using
KDD Cup 1999 data set. Table 3.1 shows the parameters of GNP. And all of the
simulations in this chapter are conducted on the same GNP parameters.
3.4.1 Training Simulations
In the training step, a sucient number of data are prepared for GNP to eciently ex-
tract rules. The training data contains 8; 068 connections randomly selected from KDD
Cup 1999 data set, among which 4116 connections are normal and 3; 952 connections
are misuse intrusion including two kinds of attacks, smurf and neptune, respectively.
smurf and neptune are the misuse intrusion types with the rst and second largest
numbers in the original database, respectively.
In KDD Cup 1999 data set, 41 attributes are included. After the sub-attribute
utilization, 165 sub-attributes are assigned to the judgment functions in GNP. As a
result of the evolution, 48; 069 rules including 43; 342 normal rules and 4; 727 misuse
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intrusion rules are extracted. Thus, many redundant or unimportant rules are also
extracted.
3.4.2 Analysis of Two-Stage Rule Pruning Method
This section aims to analyze the two stages of the proposed rule pruning method
and check their eciency on validation data, which contains 4; 086 normal connection
data and 4; 000 misuse intrusion connection data containing 2; 000 connection data of
neptune intrusion type and 2; 000 connection data of smurf intrusion type.
Using the training data, the GNP-based class association rule mining method is
applied to obtain a large number of class association rules including normal rules and
misuse intrusion rules. More rules can ensure more important and interesting informa-
tion included. However, too many rules also contain much irrelevant and redundant
information which can mislead the classication. Then, the average matching degree
and GA-based two-stage rule pruning scheme are implemented. Since the gene of GA
is encoded by the rules in the rule pool, too many rules mean too large size of genes.
Such a huge number of rules becomes an obstacle to realize GA. Therefore, the average
matching degree-based rule pruning is implemented in stage I of the two-stage method
to reduce the burden of GA-based stage.
Fig. 3.2 shows the number of pruned rules in stage I when using dierent values of
kp. It is found from Fig. 3.2 that when the value of kp increases, the number of pruned
rules of both normal rules and misuse intrusion rules increases, because the pruning
criterion in stage I is strengthened when kp increases. When the number of the pruned
rules is large, the number of reserved rules becomes small in stage I and the structure
of GA in stage II becomes simple, which means the complexity of GA will be reduced.
Only using stage II will make GA hard to deal with the large rule pool generated by
GNP.
In stage II, GA is used to select a reduced number of the best class association rules
from the remaining rule pool after executing stage I. In the proposed GA-based rule
pruning stage, the population size of GA is 120. The generation number is 100. In
genetic operators, pc = 0:2(crossover probability) and pm = 0:1(mutation probability)
are used. And Fig. 3.3 shows an example of the tness curve when kp equals to 0:9.
On the other hand, DR, ACC , PFR and NFR of the tness function can inuence
the experiments. Fig. 3.4 to Fig. 3.7 show DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR by changing
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Figure 3.3: The tness curve of GA in stage II when kp = 0:9
DR, ACC , PFR and NFR one by one in order to get a set of reasonable coecients.
It is found from Fig. 3.4 that DR and Accuracy increase as DR increases, but PFR
decreases, while NFR has no obvious change. Fig. 3.5 shows that Accuracy and PFR
increase as ACC increases, but DR is a little bit decreased, while NFR has no change.
It is also found from Fig. 3.6 that DR and Accuracy decrease as PFR increases, but
PFR decreases, while NFR increases. Fig. 3.7 also shows that DR, Accuracy and
NFR decrease as NFR increases, while PFR increases.
Generally speaking, the coecient of Accuracy can improve the accuracy, but it
makes DR reduce and PFR increase. Whereas, too much increase of PFR brings the
negative inuence on the nal results, and the improvement of NFR is not obvious
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Figure 3.4: DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR versus DR under ACC = 1:0, PFR = 10
and NFR = 10
when putting too much emphasis on the coecient of NFR. Therefore, on one hand, it
needs to avoid the negative inuence on the results brought by the change of coecients;
on the other hand, it needs to balance the relation among DR, Accuracy, PFR and
NFR in order that the value of each criterion falls in the acceptable range. Here, we
used DR = 15, ACC = 11, PFR = 30 and NFR = 30 in the experiments.
Based on the determined coecients of the tness function, the eectiveness of the
stage I only method, stage I plus stage II method and without pruning are compared
from detection performance as shown in Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9. Fig. 3.8 shows the
comparisons of DR and Accuracy among stage I, stage I plus stage II and without rule
pruning, while Fig. 3.9 shows the comparisons of NFR and PFR among stage I, stage
I plus stage II and without rule pruning. When the value of kp is less than 0:9, the
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Figure 3.5: DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR versus ACC under DR = 1:0, PFR = 10
and NFR = 10
results of both DR and Accuracy are basically stable. If kp is larger than 0:9, DR and
Accuracy sharply decrease, while PFR and NFR also sharply increase, because if the
value of kp is large, too many rules are pruned. The set of rules needs to satisfy not only
relevance or importance, but also suciency. Stage I makes GA work well to nd the
best set of rules. However, more strength on stage I tends to prune useful rules, while
less strength on stage I makes obviously redundant rules still exist in the rule pool,
which brings more burden on GA. More importantly, GA has an important inuence
on the detection performance. As the results in Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 show, stage I
plus stage II outperforms the performance of only stage I used. The matching degree
and GA-based pruning method aims to nd the optimal set of rules which is not only
interesting or important but also more helpful to direct the classication correctly. It is
also proved from Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 that around kp = 0:9 shows the best performance
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Figure 3.6: DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR versus PFR under DR = 1:0, ACC = 1:0
and NFR = 10
in terms of DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR. In addition, the eciency of two-stage
rule pruning is evaluated from time consumption by checking how much time is needed
to make classication. As shown in Fig. 3.10, the proposed two-stage rule pruning saves
much time for classication, comparing with classication without pruning rules.
3.4.3 Comparisons with Other Methods
In this simulation, the proposed method are compared with conventional GNP-based
misuse detection and anomaly detection as well as some other machine learning meth-
ods. In the proposed method, we set kp at 0:9, and 3671 rules are reserved after
the rst stage rule pruning, which contain 2697 normal rules and 974 misuse intru-
sion rules. Testing data of the proposed method is the same as that in simulation
I. Table 3.2 shows the performance comparison among GNP-based intrusion detection
system (GNP-based IDS) with Two-stage rule pruning and dierent conventional meth-
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Figure 3.7: DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR versus PFR under DR = 1:0, ACC = 1:0
and NFR = 10
ods which are GNP-based misuse detection, GNP-based anomaly detection, GP(96),
Decision Tree(51) and SVM(97). The rst column shows four criteria usually used to
evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection systems.
The results show that the proposed method obtains comparative and better per-
formances than conventional GNP-based methods and other classical methods, which
means that unied detection is eective and moreover, two-stage rule pruning is also
an eective and ecient method.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a two-stage rule pruning method is proposed to select a small set of
useful rules and has improved the detection ability. In the rst stage, the average
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of DR and Accuracy among stage I, stage I plus stage II and
without rule pruning
matching degree-based method is used to pre-prune the rules in order to improve the
eciency of GA. In the second stage, GA is implemented to pick up the eective rules
among remaining rules in the rst stage. In this method, the rules which contribute
to high detection performance are selected by GA. The two stages are evaluated using
KDD Cup 1999 data set, respectively. The inuence of parameters of the two stages
are also analyzed. Finally, the performance of the proposed rule pruning method is
compared with the performances of other methods. The simulations show that the two-
stage rule pruning has better performance from detection ability and time consumption.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of PFR and NFR among stage I, stage I plus stage II and
without rule pruning
Figure 3.10: Comparison of time consumption among no rule pruning, stage I and
two-stage
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Table 3.2: The comparisons of the proposed method with other methods
Method DR Accuracy PFR NFR
GNP   based IDS(with Two  stage Rule Pruning) 97:75% 94:91% 2:01% 2:05%
GNP   based IDS(without Two  stage Rule Pruning) 95:79% 90:17% 4:41% 3:75%
GNP   based Anomaly Detection 86:89%   18:4% 0:75%
GNP   based Misuse Detection 94:71%   3:95% 8:54%
GP 90:83%   0:68%  
Decision Trees   89:70%    
SVM 95:5%   1:0%  
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4Intrusion Detection System using
Fuzzy Genetic Network
Programming
GNP-based class association rule mining initially deals with the data with discrete at-
tributes. For the data with quantitative attributes, it usually divide them into dierent
ranges by crisp discretization. However, for the values near the border, crisp discretiza-
tion always results in under- or over-estimation in mining process, which is called sharp
boundary problem. Fuzzy sets theory introduced by Zadeh(98) in 1965 can resolve this
problem by smoothly transferring between member and non-member in fuzzy member-
ship degrees(values). And fuzzy set theory can also bring solution for imprecision and
uncertainty information, because of its simplicity and similarity to human reasoning.
4.1 Introduction
The centric topic of data mining is to extract patterns from transaction data in the
form of association rules or class association rules. The previous researches on the
rule mining usually deal with the database with those attributes having binary or
categorical values. But, for the attributes having quantitative values, it is possible to
partition the quantitative values to two or more ranges. However, simple partition
leads to losing some important information. In order to reducing the information loss
as much as possible, the information gain-based sub-attribute method is utilized to
deal with continuous attributes. However, the crisp discretization measure to process
continuous attributes results in sharp boundary problem, where the discretization of
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continuous attributes into intervals would lead to ignore or overemphasize the values
that are near boundaries. Fuzzy set theory can help us to overcome this problem by
allowing dierent degrees of memberships. Compared with traditional association rules
with crisp sets, the class association rule mining using Fuzzy GNP can provide good
linguistic explanation.
In this chapter, the concept of Fuzzy GNP-based class association rule mining is
introduced in detail. Fuzzy GNP extracts sucient class association rules for build-
ing the classiers. It is crucial to extract interesting and sucient number of class
association rules for building the classiers in intrusion detection, hence, the eciency
of Fuzzy GNP is examined in this chapter. The features of Fuzzy GNP-based class
association rule mining are summarized as follows.
1. Experienced and expert knowledge on intrusion detection is not required before
the training.
2. Fuzzy GNP can deal with both discrete and continuous attributes in intrusion
detection to overtake the sharp boundary problem in sub-attribute method.
3. Fuzzy GNP can extract diversied class association rules by evolving Fuzzy GNP.
4. Probabilistic node transition takes place of the traditional node transition in GNP.
This change also contributes to extracting diversied rules.
5. Each continuous attribute has its own initial fuzzy membership function which
is dierent from each other. In addition, the fuzzy membership functions are
evolved along with GNP.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the motivations are presented in
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, it is described how Fuzzy GNP is used to extract class
association rules. In Section 4.4, the hybrid classication method combing misuse
detection and anomaly detection is used on class association rules extracted by Fuzzy
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GNP. The simulation results are given on KDD Cup 1999 data set in Section 4.5.
Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6.
4.2 Motivations
It is easy to deal with discrete attributes in the data when extracting class associa-
tion rules. But for quantitative attributes, simple discretization leads to the loss of
important information. Most importantly, crisp discretization brings sharp bound-
ary problem. Therefore, designing an appropriate discretization for quantitative val-
ued attributes is a challenge in GNP-based class association rule mining. Fuzzy set
theory(99)(100) has the ability to solve the sharp boundary problem by representing
quantitative values as dierent fuzzy membership degrees. At the same time, the ex-
tracted rules can be represented in a more exact way. And the class association rules
become more understandable by introducing fuzzy set theory.
Generally speaking, there are two main reasons to introduce fuzzy set theory into
intrusion detection(101). First, many quantitative features are involved in intrusion
detection and can potentially be viewed as fuzzy variables. For instance, the CUP usage
time and the connection duration are two examples of quantitative features which can
be viewed as fuzzy variables. The second reason for introducing fuzzy set theory to
intrusion detection is that security itself includes fuzziness. Sometimes, the value of
the quantitative attribute can decide the data is more like normal or intrusion. The
fuzzy membership degrees can show how much it belongs to normal and how much it
belongs to intrusion.
By introducing fuzzy set theory into GNP, probabilistic node transition is used,
which improves the exploration ability of useful class association rules. In this way,
much more diversied rules can be extracted. Both quality and quantity of extracted
rules can be improved by Fuzzy GNP. Hence, it can ensure the detection ability of
intrusion detection.
4.3 Class Association Rule Mining using Fuzzy GNP
4.3.1 Fuzzy Membership Functions for Continuous Attributes
Firstly, the values of all continuous attributes of the database are fuzzied into three
linguistic terms like Low, Middle and High as shown in Fig. 4.1. These linguistic
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terms are dened by the combination of trapezoidal and triangular membership func-
tions symmetrically spaced. Each continuous attribute is associated with its own fuzzy
membership function.
Fuzzy set theory came from the desire to describe complex systems with linguistic
descriptions. In most of the real-world applications such as data mining, the types
of data are complex, i.e., not only the type of boolean, but also many other types
are also included. In this chapter, the advantage of fuzzy set theory is used allowing
every continuous attribute to have fuzzy membership values in [0; 1]. Furthermore, each
continuous attribute in the database is transformed into three linguistic terms (Low,
Middle and High). Besides, the membership function of each continuous attribute is
evolved generation by generation in order to discover many interesting rules.
Figure 4.1: Fuzzy Membership Function of attribute Ai
Actually, the parameters of i, i and i of fuzzy attribute Ai shown in Fig. 4.1 are
also evolved along with GNP evolution. Once a GNP individual starts the searching
for class association rules, the fuzzy membership values are used to determine the
transitions in GNP individuals.
4.3.2 Class Association Rule Mining using Fuzzy GNP
Considering sub-attribute utilization mechanism, binary attribute Land is divided into
two sub-attributes Land = 1 and Land = 0. The symbolic attribute is divided into two
or more sub-attributes. As to the continuous attributes shown in Fig. 4.2, attribute
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A1 and A2 can be transformed into fuzzy membership values by the fuzzy membership
functions.
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Figure 4.2: An example of transformation of continuous attributes
When a judgment node represents continuous attribute Ai with linguistic term
Qi 2 fLow;Middle;Highg, the transition from the current judgment node to the next
node is determined by the membership value of the fuzzy attribute Ai with linguistic
term Qi(30).
Class association rule mining based on Fuzzy GNP successfully combines fuzzy set
theory with conventional class association rule mining, which utilizes discrete attributes
and continuous attributes in one single rule. Fig. 4.3 shows how class association
candidate rules extract using Fuzzy GNP. In Fig. 4.3, processing node P1 serves as the
starting point of the class association rule mining and connects to a judgement node.
One judgment node has two possible branches, Yes-side branch and No-side branch. As
Fig. 4.3 shows, the rst judgement node J1 examines the judgment function whether
the discrete attribute Land equals to 1. If it equals to 1, J1 would connect to another
judgment node which is J2 in Fig. 4.3. If it does not equal to 1, then a candidate
rule which contains only one item in the antecedent part is extracted. Then, judgment
node J2 checks the function whether the discrete attribute service equals to http. If the
judgment function is not satised, one more candidate rule is extracted, which has two
items in the antecedent part. Otherwise, the transition is done to another judgment
node. In Fig. 4.3, J3 would check the continuous attribute count = Low, then Fuzzy
GNP is used to decide which branch should be selected. At the end of evolution, Fuzzy
GNP automatically counts the number a, b and c, which are the numbers of tuples
moving to Yes-side at the judgment nodes. aN , bN , cN are those with Normal class
in the application of intrusion detection. aI , bI , cI are those with Misuse Intrusion
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class. Then, the criteria of the support, confidence and 2 can be calculated using the
values counted by Fuzzy GNP.
Figure 4.3: Mining class association candidate rules using Fuzzy GNP
There are two main dierences between Fuzzy GNP and regular GNP. One is the
functions of judgment nodes. This dierence means that the functions of judgment
nodes examined should be about continuous attributes. The other is the node transi-
tion, which means that once continuous attributes are examined, the probabilistic node
transition should be used to decide Yes-side or No-side.
4.3.3 Probabilistic Node Transition in Fuzzy GNP
Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5 show how the two kinds of probabilistic transition of judgment
nodes are done in Fuzzy GNP individuals, simple probabilistic transition and accurate
probabilistic transition, respectively.
In the simple probabilistic transition, if the membership value Qi(ai) of continuous
attribute Ai with linguistic term Qi is greater than or equal 0:5, then go to the Yes-side
of the judgment node, otherwise, go to the No-side of the judgment node as shown in
Fig. 4.4, where ai is the value of continuous attribute Ai.
In the accurate probabilistic node transition, a random value r is generated uni-
formly and compared with the fuzzy value of the continuous attribute like Fig. 4.5
shows.
In the accurate probabilistic transition, a random number r is generated and com-
pared with the membership value of the continuous attribute in Fig. 4.1. If the random
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Figure 4.4: Simple probabilistic node transition from one judgment node to another
number is smaller than or equal to the membership value Qi(ai), then go to the Yes-
side of the judgment node, otherwise, go to the No-side of the judgment node.
Figure 4.5: Accurate probabilistic node transition from one judgment node to another
4.3.4 Mutation of Fuzzy Membership Function
At the beginning of evolving fuzzy membership function (FMF), the parameters of i
and i for attribute Ai should be initialized by analyzing the distribution of the data,
i is automatically calculated by (2i   i).
Then, nonuniform mutation is used to adjust the parameters i, i for each con-
tinuous attribute Ai. During the process of evolving, the parameters are selected by
non-uniform mutation with the probability of Pm. Let xk be a parameter selected for
mutation in the kth generation, then we can calculate xk+1 as follows.
xk+1 =
(
xk +(k; UB   xk); when  is 0;
xk  (k; xk   LB); when  is 1;
(4.1)
where, UB and LB are the upper and lower bounds of variable xk, and  is a random
binary value in f0; 1g. The function (k; y) returns a value in (0; y), where (k; y)
approaches 0 as k increases. Such property causes the operator to search the space
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uniformly at rst and very locally in the later generations. The actual (k; y) can be
calculated by the following equation:
(k; y) = y(1  r(1 k=T )); (4.2)
where, r is a uniform random number in (0; 1), T is the maximal generation number
and  is a system parameter determining the degree of dependency on the generation
number.
4.3.5 Fitness Function and Genetic Operators in GNP
In order to selecting the interesting class association rules for classier, we dene the
tness function of GNP individuals by
F =
X
r2R
f2(r) + 10(n(r)  1) + new(r)g; (4.3)
where, R is a set of suxes of extracted important rules, 2(r) is the 2 value of rule
r, and n(r) is the number of attributes in the antecedent part of rule r. new(r) is an
additional constant dened by the following equation
new(r) =
(
new; when rule r is newly extracted;
0; otherwise:
(4.4)
2(r), n(r) and new(r) are concerned with the importance, complexity and novelty
of rule r, respectively.
In each generation, the individuals are ranked by their tness values and upper 1=3
individuals are selected, then they are reproduced by three kinds of genetic operators
for the next generation.
Crossover is executed between two parents and two ospring is generated. In detail,
each node in parent individuals is selected as a crossover node with the probability of Pc.
Then, two parents exchange the genes of the corresponding crossover nodes. Finally,
the generated individuals become new ones in the next generation.
Whereas, mutation is executed in one individual. Two kinds of mutation operators
are also used to evolve Fuzzy GNPs. Each branch is selected with the probability of Pm1
and changed to another node and each node function is selected with the probability
of Pm2 and changed to another one.
The ow chart of Fuzzy GNP class association rule mining is shown in Fig. 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Flow chart of class association rule mining using Fuzzy GNP
4.4 Building Classier
4.4.1 Matching Measure
The rst step of the classication is to calculate the average matching degree of each
connection data with the rules of each class, which can solve the problem that the
conventional matching measure easily favors the minority too much(102). Dierent
from the GNP-based class association rule mining in chapter 2, the matching degree
in this chapter can be divided into two parts according to continuous attributes and
discrete attributes in the class association rules extracted by Fuzzy GNP. The matching
degree for continuous attribute can be calculated using Eq.(4.5).
MatchDegree(Qi; ai) = Qi(ai); (4.5)
where, Qi means the linguistic term of continuous attribute Ai in rule r. ai means the
value of the attribute Ai. Qi represents the membership function for linguistic term
Qi.
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Then, the whole matching degree of data d with rule r in class k(including p con-
tinuous attributes and q discrete attributes) is dened by:
Matchk(d; r) =
1
p+ q
(
X
i2CA
Qi(ai) + t); (4.6)
where, CA is the set of suxes of continuous attributes in rule r of class k, and t is the
number of matched discrete attributes in rule r of class k with data d. As a result, the
average matching degree can be dened by
mk(d) =
1
jRkj
X
r2Rk
Matchk(d; r); (4.7)
where, Rk is the set of suxes of the extracted rules in class k in the rule pool.
4.4.2 Classication based on the Average Matching Degree
The classication method is the same as the one used in chapter 2. After obtaining
the average matching degree between training data and the rules in class k, the mean
 and standard deviation  of the average matching degrees over all the training data
in class k as shown in Eq.(4.8) and Eq.(4.9), respectively.
k =
1
j Dk j
X
d2Dk
mk(d); (4.8)
k =
s
1
jDkj
X
d2Dk
(mk(d)  k)2: (4.9)
where, Dk is the set of suxes of training data in class k.
Then, N and N represent the distribution of the average matching degree of
normal training data with normal rules, and I and I represent that of misuse training
data with misuse intrusion rules. When a new testing data dnew comes, the average
matching degree of the new testing data with the rules in the normal rule pool and
misuse intrusion rule pool are calculated as mN (dnew) and mI(dnew). According to
the procedure explained in chapter 2, new data dnew can be distinguished as normal,
misuse intrusion and anomaly intrusion.
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Table 4.1: Parameters of Fuzzy GNP-based rule extraction
Population Size 120
Generation 1000
Processing Node 10
Judgment Node 100
Crossover Rate 1=5
Mutation Rate1 1=3
Mutation Rate2 1=3
4.5 Simulations
The simulations are conducted on the intrusion detection database of KDD CUP 1999.
In order to analyze the proposed method, Fuzzy GNP based rule mining with simple
probabilistic node transition and that with accurate probabilistic node transition will
be studied in this section. In addition, the analysis of parameters are done. And the
eect of Fuzzy GNP and and that of GNP with the hybrid classier are compared using
the average matching degree space.
4.5.1 Performance of Fuzzy GNP Mining Class Association Rule with
Two Kinds of Node Transitions
10; 000 network connections are randomly chosen from KDD CUP data set as the
training data which consists of 5; 000 normal network connections and 5; 000 intrusion
network connections including two kinds of attacks, neptune and smurf . The pa-
rameters of Fuzzy GNP are summarized in Table 4.1. A new rule, which satises the
minimum support, condence and 2, is extracted. The minimum condence is set at
0:8 and the minimum 2 is set at 6:63. The minimum support is set at 0:1 and 0:075
for normal and intrusion rules, respectively.
After 1; 000 generations, Fuzzy GNP extracts 46; 346 and 61; 628 rules using simple
probabilistic node transition and accurate probabilistic node transition, respectively.
The conventional GNP extracts 26; 433 rules from the same training data. Fig. 4.7
shows the number of extracted rules versus generation. In Fig. 4.7, the boldest line
in blue represents the number of extracted rules by Fuzzy GNP with accurate prob-
abilistic node transition. The bold line in green represents the number of extracted
rules by Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transition. And the normal line
in red represents the number of extracted rules by conventional GNP. The numbers of
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Figure 4.7: Total number of extracted rules by GNP
extracted rules in Fig. 4.7 indicate that Fuzzy GNP has the ability to extract much
more rules than conventional GNP. And the accurate probabilistic node transition can
contribute to extracting more class association rules than the simple one.
Figure 4.8: The evolution of fuzzy membership function of attribute "duration"
Fig. 4.8 shows an example of the evolution of the fuzzy membership function. The
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rst fuzzy membership function is the initial one. The second is the one evolved after
500 generations. The third is the nal fuzzy membership function.
In this case, the settings of the parameters kI and kN are very important because the
classier must classify three kinds of data including anomaly intrusion simultaneously.
So, rst, the analysis of the parameters is given by the simulations using a validation
data set, and the best parameters for the testing are determined.
1) Analysis and determination of the weight parameters in the validation: The
validation data contains 748 normal connection data, 240 misuse intrusion connection
data and 80 anomaly intrusion data which are not contained in the training data.
First, the eects of the parameters kI and kN are analyzed on the class association
rules extracted by Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transition and that with
accurate probabilistic node transition, respectively. Fig. 4.9 shows DR, Accuracy, PFR
and NFR based on Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transition and Table 4.2
shows the corresponding parameter settings use in Fig. 4.9. Setting 1-6 shows that, as
Figure 4.9: Eects of the parameter settings on DR, ACC, PFR and NFR in the case
of simple probabilistic node transitions
kN increases, DR, Accuracy and PFR are improved although NFR is increased. After
that, DR, Accuracy are decreased and NFR becomes worse with the increase of kN .
And the improvement of PFR is not obvious. Thus, kN is set at 3. Then, with the
increase of kI , DR and Accuracy are increased at the setting 9, 10. And NFR is better
than that in the setting 7, 8. At the beginning of setting 11, DR and Accuracy become
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Table 4.2: Parameter settings in the case of simple probabilistic node transition
setting kI kN
1 1:0 0:5
2 1:0 1:0
3 1:0 1:5
4 1:0 2:0
5 1:0 2:5
6 1:0 3:0
7 1:0 3:5
8 1:0 4:5
9 1:5 3:0
10 2:0 3:0
11 2:5 3:0
12 3:0 3:0
13 3:5 3:0
lower while NFR is increased and PFR is not changed. Therefore, kI and kN in the
case of simple probabilistic node transition is set at 2:0 and 3:0, respectively.
Figure 4.10: Eects of the parameter settings on DR, ACC, PFR and NFR in the case
of accurate probabilistic node transitions
Fig. 4.10 shows DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR based on Fuzzy GNP with simple
probabilistic node transition and Table 4.3 shows the corresponding parameter settings
used in Fig. 4.10. The settings 1-5 indicate the detection ability except NFR is increased
with kN increases. When kN is increased more like the settings 6-8, the detection ability
becomes worse. So, kN is xed at 2:7 as setting 5 and the eect of kI is examined. At
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Table 4.3: Parameter settings in the case of accurate probabilistic node transition
setting kI kN
1 1:0 0:5
2 1:0 1:0
3 1:0 1:5
4 1:0 2:0
5 1:0 2:7
6 1:0 3:5
7 1:0 4:1
8 1:0 4:6
9 1:5 2:7
10 2:0 2:7
11 2:7 2:7
12 3:1 2:7
13 3:5 2:7
the beginning, the increase of kI improves the detection ability. Till the setting 10, the
detection performance becomes bad in the setting 11-13. By the analysis, kI and kN
in the case of accurate probabilistic node transition are set at 2:0 and 2:7.
Table 4.4: Classication results of Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transitions
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 1928 1 1 1930
Misuse(A) 166 7444 278 7888
Anomaly(A) 130 7 45 182
Total 2224 7452 324 10000
2) Testing results: The testing data set contains 10,000 connection data, where 8
new types of attacks are included. The classication results of the class association
rules extracted by Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transition and accurate
probabilistic node transition are shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively. In
the tables, Normal(C), Misuse(C) and Anomaly(C) indicate the number of normal,
misuse intrusions and anomaly intrusions labeled by the hybrid classier, respectively,
while Normal(A), Misuse(A) and Anomaly(A) indicate the actual number of normal,
misuse intrusions and anomaly intrusions, respectively.
From the tables, DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR of Fuzzy GNP with simple proba-
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Table 4.5: Classication results of Fuzzy GNP with accurate probabilistic node transitions
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 1923 7 0 1930
Misuse(A) 7 7451 430 7888
Anomaly(A) 121 2 59 182
Total 2051 7460 489 10000
bilistic node transition are calculated as
DR = (1928 + 7444 + 45 + 7 + 278)=10000 = 97:02% (4.10)
Accuracy = (1928 + 7444 + 45)=10000 = 94:17% (4.11)
PFR = (1 + 1)=1930 = 0:10% (4.12)
NFR = (166 + 130)=(7888 + 182) = 3:67% (4.13)
Those of Fuzzy GNP with accurate probabilistic node transition are calculated as
DR = (1923 + 7451 + 59 + 2 + 430)=10000 = 98:65% (4.14)
Accuracy = (1923 + 7451 + 59)=10000 = 94:33% (4.15)
PFR = (1 + 1)=1930 = 0:36% (4.16)
NFR = (7 + 121)=(7888 + 182) = 1:59% (4.17)
Comparing Fuzzy GNP with simple probabilistic node transition, the accurate prob-
abilistic node transition one shows better DR, Accuracy and NFR. Although PFR is
higher than that in the case of simple probabilistic node transition, the dierence be-
tween two cases is very slight. The accurate probabilistic node transition contributes to
the better performance since it has more precise probabilistic natures than the simple
one.
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4.5.2 Comparison of Fuzzy GNP with GNP on Classication Perfor-
mances
Table 4.6: Classication results of GNP
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 1835 1 94 1930
Misuse(A) 78 7324 486 7888
Anomaly(A) 135 7 40 182
Total 2048 7332 620 10000
The classication performance of GNP is also compared with that of Fuzzy GNP.
From Table 4.6, DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR are calculated as
DR = (1835 + 7324 + 40 + 7 + 486)=10000 = 96:92% (4.18)
Accuracy = (1835 + 7324 + 40)=10000 = 91:99% (4.19)
PFR = (1 + 94)=1930 = 4:92% (4.20)
NFR = (78 + 135)=(7888 + 182) = 2:64% (4.21)
Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12 show the comparisons of the classication results among GNP
and Fuzzy GNP with two dierent kinds of node transition, respectively. As higher
DR and Accuracy are better, while lower PFR and NFR are better. Therefore, from
the comparisons between Fuzzy GNP and GNP, both Fuzzy GNPs with accurate node
transition and simple node transition have higher DR and Accuracy than those of GNP.
Meanwhile, Fuzzy GNP decreases PFR and NFR comparing with GNP. Therefore, the
proposed Fuzzy GNP has better detection performance. Fuzzy GNP has the ability to
extract more useful class association rules than GNP.
On the other hand, the accurate probabilistic node transition presents more precise
probabilistic nature than simple probabilistic method. From the gures, DR, Accuracy
and NFR except PFR are better than the simple one. PFR is only 0:36%.
In addition, the performance of the proposed Fuzzy GNP is compared with some
other machine learning techniques for intrusion detection. All the simulation results in
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Figure 4.11: Comparing the classication results of Fuzzy GNP and GNP on DR and
Accuracy
Figure 4.12: Comparing the classication results of Fuzzy GNP and GNP on PFR and
NFR
Table 4.7 are conducted on KDD99Cup Dataset for fair comparisons(97). It is found
from Table 4.7 that the proposed method outperforms the conventional machine learn-
ing techniques for intrusion detection in terms of detection rate. In Table 4.7, APNT
represents accurate probabilistic node transition and SPNT means simple probabilistic
node transition.
64
4.6 Conclusions
Table 4.7: Performance of comparisons among the intelligent methods
Technique Detection Rate(%)
Fuzzy GNP with APNT 98:65
Fuzzy GNP with SPNT 97:02
GNP 96:92
C4:5 95:0
Support V ector Machine 95:5
Muilti Layer Perception 94:5
K  Means Clustering 65:0
Hidden Markov Model(HMM) 79:0
C4:5 +Hybrid Neural Networks 93:3
Genetic Programming 91:0
K  Nearest Neighbor 92:0
Neural Networks+ PCA 92:2
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, Fuzzy GNP is proposed to extract class association rules from network
connection data. In addition, the average matching degree is correspondingly modied
considering fuzzy part and non-fuzzy part of one rule.
Fuzzy set theory is integrated into GNP, aiming at dealing with the fuzziness in the
class association rules of intrusion detection problem and the sharp boundary problem
in crisp discretization of GNP-based class association rule mining. Each generation
gets the fuzzy values for each continuous attribute and the parameters of the fuzzy
membership functions are evolved by non-uniform mutation in order to perform more
global search in early stages and local search in later stages. Besides, the proposed
accurate probabilistic node transition can contribute to the diversied class associa-
tion rules. By this way, both quality and quantity are improved by Fuzzy GNP with
probabilistic node transition. The simulation results on KDD Cup 1999 indicate that
the proposed method can get good detection performance. And the accurate prob-
abilistic node transition can extract more useful rules than simple probabilistic node
transition and has better detection ability owing to its precise probabilistic nature. It
is also showed that the proposed Fuzzy GNP is better than other conventional machine
learning approaches for intrusion detection in terms of Detection Rate.
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However, it still has much space to improve. From the simulation analysis, the
anomaly intrusions are hard to detect in the hybrid framework of intrusion detection
system because of its natures of new and diversity. Therefore, an eective classier is
needed to accurately identify normal, misuse and anomaly intrusions.
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5Classication for Intrusion
Detection System using Distance
Approach
Building an accurate and ecient classier is one of the essential tasks of data mining
and machine learning research. As stated in (63), classication generally maps a data
into one of several predened categories. An ideal approach in intrusion detection
would be to learn a classier from gathered normal and intrusion data, then label or
predict new unseen data as the normal class or intrusion class.
In addition, the two-stage rule pruning method alleviate the overlapping problem by
pruning the redundant and irrelevant rules from the rule pool. An ecient classication
method is needed to deal with the overlapping part since the rule pruning cannot
thoroughly solve this problem. In order to enhance the detection ability of IDS, Chapter
6 and Chapter 7 will focus on the classication algorithms of intrusion detection which
can better use the class association rules extracted by Fuzzy GNP.
5.1 Introduction
Since ecient classication algorithms are extremely important for intrusion detection,
a large number of studies has been conducted. K-Nearest neighbor(KNN) is an ex-
tremely simple yet surprisingly eective method for a classication. Its advantages
stem from the fact that its decision surface are nonlinear with only a single integer
parameter. More importantly, these advantages do not cause the over-tting(103)(28),
and it is not restricted to any specic data distribution.
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In this chapter, a novel distance-based classication method is proposed, which
originates from K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) decision rule, where, the multiple feature
space is projected into a two-dimensional space describing the degree that the connec-
tion data belong to normal or misuse intrusion based on the average matching degree.
Then, K-Closest neighbor classier is employed to categorize each new data into ei-
ther normal or misuse intrusion. However, usually anomaly connection data have been
mixed into normal or misuse intrusion. Considering the above, a multiple centroid-
based modication is introduced in order to improve the detection performance. In the
proposed method, the centroids of anomaly intrusion data are dened by the centroids
of normal data and misuse intrusion data. The importance of the proposed method is
that misuse intrusion data also have the contribution to detecting anomaly intrusion
data. The main features of Distance-based classication are summarized as follows.
1. It is a non-parametric approach, where only the number of the closest neighbors
should be determined. Whereas, the simulations on dierent numbers of the clos-
est neighbors indicate that the detection ability is not so sensitive to this number.
2. The nature of anomaly intrusion is take into account by making full use of the
information from normal and misuse intrusion connection data. Therefore, the
centroids of dierent classes are proposed to make the classication.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The motivations of this chapter
is presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the data set used in this chapter. A
new Distance-based classication method is introduced in Section 5.4. Simulations are
shown in Section 5.5. Finally, we conclude the summary in Section 5.6.
5.2 Motivations
The two-stage rule pruning method can reduce the inuence of the redundant and irrel-
evant rules to alleviate the overlapping problem, which occurs in the two-dimensional
average matching degree space. However, it cannot fully solve the overlapping in the
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case that two connection data have similar behaviors, especially for some anomaly in-
trusions similar to normal behaviors. Therefore, an ecient classication is needed to
deal with such an overlapping problem.
On the other hand, in hybrid classier, the mean and standard deviation model
shows that the classication boundary is linear. Intrusion detection is a complex clas-
sication problem. It contains a wide variety of network behaviors. Moreover, it is
a synthesis of multi-class classication and anomaly identication. A linear model is
dicult to get better results because intrusion detection is a non-linear problem actu-
ally. Classication boundary is not linear by nding the nearest neighbors for each new
data. And it has no unique model for classication.
In addition, anomaly intrusions are dicult to detect. This is an important reason
that accuracy is not good enough. From the other aspect, it is vital to identify anomaly
intrusions from normal and misuse intrusions. Traditional anomaly intrusion detection
techniques assume that there is only "normal" class and any data that does not belong
to the normal class is an anomaly class data. But in reality, the new connection data
has the possibility belonging to misuse intrusions. And identifying anomaly intrusions
exactly is essential to analyze new intrusion class for further protection of computers
and networks. Because there is no information about anomaly intrusions. How to make
full use of known information is critical to improve the detection ability. Using detail
information to detect the extract class of the data is not good, because it will be biased
to part of the data. Therefore, overall information is used to dene the general regions
of anomaly intrusions.
5.3 Data Description
NSL-KDD(104)(105) is used to conduct the simulations as the subset of KDD Cup
1999 data set. This data set is important to evaluate the intrusion detection systems
especially anomaly intrusions. NSL-KDD data set avoids two problems of KDD Cup
1999 data set for network-based anomaly detection. The rst problem is the huge
number of redundant records. Analyzing KDD Cup 1999, 78% and 75% of the records
are duplicated in the training set and testing set, respectively. Too many redundant
records may cause the algorithms to be biased towards the more frequent records,
and thus prevent it from learning unfrequent records. The existence of these repeated
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records in the testing set, may cause the evaluation results to be biased by the methods
which have better detection rates on the frequent records. The other problem is the
level of diculty. In general, the typical approach for performing anomaly detection
using the KDD Cup 1999 data set is to employ a machine learning algorithm to learn
the general behavior of the data set in order to be able to dierentiate between normal
and malicious activities. In order to improve the level of diculty in testing set, NSL-
KDD only select the records which are dicult to be identied. To solve the two issues,
NSL-KDD removed all the repeated records in the entire KDD Cup 1999 training and
testing set and kept only one copy of each record.
Same with KDD Cup 1999 data set, each record of NSL-KDD data set has 41
features. All the data in NSL-KDD are labeled and classied into normal or 24 training
attack types, with additional 14 types in the test data only.
5.4 Classication using Distance Approach
In the distance-based classication model, the basic idea is to represent data d as
a combination of the average matching degree with the rules in class k, k 2 C =
f1; 2; :::; Lg, which is the coordinate of (m1(d);m2(d); :::;mL(d)) in a L-dimensional
space calculated by Eq.(3). In case of Intrusion Detection Systems, there are 2 classes:
one is normal and the other is misuse intrusion. Thus, the coordinate of data d is
(mN (d);mI(d)).
Building phase of average matching degree space In order to build the distance-
based classication model, all training data should be mapped into the L-dimensional
average matching degree space. As to IDS, normal data is included in the training
data as well as misuse intrusion data. For this reason, each training data d should be
represented as the coordinate of (mN (d);mI(d)) in the 2-dimensional average matching
degree space.
Fig. 5.1 shows an example of the distributions of both normal and misuse intrusion
training data in the 2-dimensional average matching degree space. However, in real
applications, we should point out that the distribution of the average matching degree
calculated by training data is scattered and also the distributions of these two classes
are overlapped to some extent as shown in Fig. 5.2. This is one of reasons that leads
to inaccuracy in the classication phase.
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Figure 5.1: An example of 2-dimensional average matching degree space for IDS
Figure 5.2: Overlapping in 2-dimensional average matching degree space for IDS
Fuzzy GNP has the ability of extracting a huge number of class association rules
for classication. However, too many rules usually contain many redundant, irrelevant
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and obvious information, which has the negative inuence on distinguishing normal
and intrusion. In this case, the utilization of such rules leads to the overlapping in the
2-dimensional average matching degree space.
Therefore, the two-stage rule pruning method is used to alleviate the overlapping
problem, where no domain knowledge is needed for pruning as in chapter 3. After
pruning, the conict rules are eliminated and the general rules are reserved.
Classication phase in average matching degree space
Figure 5.3: Distance-based classication model
When new data dnew is observed, dnew is also represented as the coordinate of
(mN (dnew);mI(dnew)). The Euclidean distance between new data dnew and training
data d in class k in the 2-dimensional average matching degree space, denoted by
Dk(dnew), can be dened as follows,
Dk(dnew) =
1
jDK Closest(k)j
X
d2DK Closest(k)
D(dnew; d); (5.1)
where, D(dnew; d) is the distance between new data dnew and training data d in the
2-dimensional average matching degree space, DK Closest(k) is the set of suxes of
K-Closest training data in class k in the 2-dimensional average matching degree space
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to new data dnew. It is reasonable to tell that new data dnew is more likely to be
normal data or misuse intrusion data by comparing DN (dnew) and DI(dnew). That is,
new data dnew is labeled as the class of the smaller distance between DN (dnew) and
DI(dnew). As Eq. (5) shows, K-closest neighbor uses the average value of the distances
of data dnew to its K closest training points. The application of K-Closest neighbor
method can deal with the overlapping problem to some extent by using the important
information on the training data for classication.
In addition, anomaly intrusions should be considered to improve the performance
of intrusion detection, because it is dangerous that new attacks are easily regarded as
normal connections. Thus, it is appropriate to suppose some points as the centroids of
anomaly intrusions. However, we have no information about such anomaly intrusions.
So, we should analyze the available information from the normal and misuse intrusion
data in the training set to solve this problem.
Based on the given information about normal data and misuse intrusion data, the
centroid point (CN (N); CI(N)) of normal training data, called normal centroid, can be
calculated using Eqs.(5.2)(5.3).
CN (N) =
P
d2DTrain(normal)mN (d)
jDTrain(normal)j ; (5.2)
CI(N) =
P
d2DTrain(normal)mI(d)
jDTrain(normal)j ; (5.3)
where DTrain(normal) is the set of suxes of normal training data. While the centroid
point (CN (I); CI(I)) of misuse intrusion training data, called misuse intrusion centroid,
can also be calculated in the same way. Then, anomaly centroid points are manually
set by using the coordinates of normal centroid and misuse intrusion centroid, i.e.,
(CN (I); CI(N)) and (CN (N); CI(I)).
Once the four centroids are determined, the distances of new data dnew to normal
or misuse intrusion can be recalculated by D0N (dnew) or D
0
I(dnew). The distance of
new data dnew to anomaly intrusion centroids, denoted by DA(dnew), is also calculated.
Fig. 5.3 shows the basic idea to decide the centroids for anomaly intrusion data, where
D0N (dnew) and D
0
I(dnew) are calculated by Eqs.(5.4)(5.5) using normal centroid and
misuse intrusion centroid, meanwhile DA(dnew) is calculated by Eq.(5.6) using anomaly
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Figure 5.4: Classication procedure
intrusion centroids. Since the anomaly intrusions usually pretend to be normal behav-
iors to attack the computers or systems, they are similar with normal behaviors to some
extent. However, they are new intrusions in nature. Thereby, they have some features
of misuse intrusions, but do not equal to the known intrusions completely. Therefore,
its reasonable to assume that anomaly intrusions are like neither misuse intrusion nor
normal behaviors, or like both misuse intrusion and normal behaviors. The general
procedure for intrusion detection is shown in Fig. 5.4.
D0N (dnew) =
p
(mN (dnew)  CN (N))2 + (mI(dnew)  CI(N))2 (5.4)
D0I(dnew) =
p
(mN (dnew)  CN (I))2 + (mI(dnew)  CI(I))2 (5.5)
DA(dnew) = minf
p
(mN (dnew)  CN (I))2 + (mI(dnew)  CI(N))2;p
(mN (dnew)  CN (N))2 + (mI(dnew)  CI(I))2g
(5.6)
5.5 Simulations
To evaluate the proposed method, the simulations are conducted mainly using the data
set of NSL-KDD in addition to KDDCup 1999 data set.
Since NSL-KDD data set is not biased toward frequent records, the training set in
NSL-KDD is used to extract rules. We randomly selected 4; 000 data for the training
data set from NSL-KDD, which has 2; 000 normal data and 2; 000 misuse intrusion data
consisting of 1; 500 with neptune type and 500 with smurf type.
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Table 5.1: Parameters of Fuzzy GNP-based class association rule mining
Population Size 120
Generation 1000
Processing Node 10
Judgment Node 100
Crossover Rate 1=5
Mutation RatePm1 1=3
Mutation RatePm2 1=3
2min 6:64
supportmin (N) 0:1
supportmin (I) 0:075
confidencemin 0:8
For rule extraction, Fuzzy GNP-based class association rule mining is applied and its
parameters are listed in Table 5.1, where, supportmin (N) means the minimum support
value to select interesting normal rules, and supportmin (I) means the minimum support
value to select interesting misuse intrusion rules. After 1; 000 generations of evolution,
Fuzzy GNPs extract 50; 324 rules consisting of 15; 149 normal rules, 25; 022 neptune
misuse intrusion rules and 10; 153 smurf misuse intrusion rules. Fig. 5.5 shows the total
number of accumulated rules extracted vs. generation.
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Figure 5.5: Number of accumulated rules extracted vs. generation
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Table 5.2: Results of distance-based classication on KDD Cup 1999
Probe U2R R2L DoS neptune & smurf
Number of test data 4; 116 228 12; 189 229; 851 222; 092
DR 94:83% 75:88% 70:73% 97:54% 99:98%
5.5.1 Performances of Distance-based Classier
As the number of rules is too large to build the classier, the two-stage rule pruning
mechanism is implemented to pick up useful rules and to reduce the inuence of redun-
dant and irrelevant rules in the rule pool. As a result, there remain only 432 normal
rules, 416 misuse intrusion rules with neptune type and 152 misuse intrusion rules with
smurf type after pruning. Then, the average matching degrees of each training data
with normal rules or misuse intrusion rules are mapped into the two dimensional space.
Even though many redundant and irrelevant rules are generated in the rule pool,
the class association rule mining is eective and ecient. The reasons are as follows.
In class association rule mining, the values of the support, confidence and 2
are main criteria to evaluate whether a rule is important or not. If the minimum
values of the support, confidence and 2 are set at high values, the number of the
class association rules extracted becomes very small. But, it is not a good approach.
Generally speaking, many rules with lower criteria should be extracted rst, then some
of them should be pruned in terms of obtaining the better performance for classication,
because the rules with low criteria might contribute to the better performance.
In this section, two simulations are performed. Firstly, the test data from original
KDD Cup 1999 data set are used to check DR of the proposed method on the four kinds
of attacks. Table 5.2 shows DR of each kind of attacks with K = 30. In addition to the
four kinds of attacks, the case is also listed where only neptune type and smurf type
exist in the group of DoS intrusion. From Table 5.2, DR on these two types reaches
99:98%. Even those types do not exist in the training data, the proposed classier can
detect the intrusions well.
Next, the KDDTest+ data in NSL-KDD data set is considered to evaluate the
eectiveness of the distance-based classier with K = 30. DR, Accuracy, PFR and
NFR are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed classier in this experiment.
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Table 5.3: Results of distance-based classication on NSL-KDD
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 8; 080 168 1; 463 9; 711
Misuse(A) 0 5; 301 21 5; 322
Anomaly(A) 1; 910 1; 010 4; 591 7; 511
Total 9; 990 6; 479 6; 075 22; 544
In this data set, each connection record is dierent from each other, meanwhile, normal,
misuse intrusion and anomaly intrusion are all included.
The classication results of the proposed method are shown in Table 5.3. Normal(C),
Misuse(C) and Anomaly(C) indicate the number of normal, misuse intrusions and
anomaly intrusions labeled by the Distance-based classier, respectively, whileNormal(A),
Misuse(A) and Anomaly(A) indicate the actual number of normal, misuse intrusions
and anomaly intrusions, respectively. From Table 5.3, it is obvious that most of anomaly
intrusion data can be detected by this classier, which means it has better detection
ability on anomaly intrusions.
According to Table 5.3, DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR are calculated as shown in
Eq.(5.7)(5.10).
DR = (8; 080 + 5; 301 + 4; 591 + 1; 010 + 21)=22; 544 = 84:29% (5.7)
Accuracy = (8; 080 + 5; 301 + 4; 591)=22; 544 = 79:72% (5.8)
PFR = (168 + 1; 463)=9; 711 = 16:80% (5.9)
NFR = (1; 910 + 0)=(5; 322 + 7; 511) = 14:88% (5.10)
From Eq.(5.7)(5.10), even on the KDDTest+ data set which is dicult to detect,
the proposed classier can get good performance. Since the results are obtained by
conducting simulations using the NSL-KDD testing data set, the testing data show
the high diculty level in dierent types of attacks. Though 14:88% seems a little bit
high, 4; 591 in Table 4 represents that many of the anomaly intrusions can be detected
accurately. The proposed method is ecient especially for anomaly intrusions because
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the anomaly intrusions are usually similar to normal data and too dicult to detect.
The proposed classication method provides more accurate information to the classier
in terms of adding the centroids for anomaly intrusions.
Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 show the comparisons of the proposed classier and hybrid
classier, where Fig. 5.6 shows the comparisons of DR and Accuracy, while Fig. 5.7
shows the comparisons of PFR and NFR. The set of rules used in hybrid classier is
also extracted by Fuzzy GNP and has been pruned by two-stage rule pruning method.
Figure 5.6: DR and ACC comparisons between distance-based classier and hybrid
classier
Obviously, DR and Accuracy of the Distance-based classier is higher than those
of hybrid classier, in addition, PFR of the proposed classier is lower than that of
hybrid classier. Only NFR is a little bit higher than hybrid classier. Consequently,
the performance of the Distance-based classier outperforms hybrid classier. And the
reason for better performance of the proposed classier is that it provides more accurate
information to the classier in terms of adding the centroids for anomaly intrusions.
On the other hand, since the distance-based classier is a non-parametric method,
the number K of nearest neighbors is the only factor which should be pre-determined.
Therefore, we also checked the inuence of this factor on the performance of the pro-
posed method. DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR are not so sensitive to K as shown in
Table 5.4.
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Figure 5.7: PFR and NFR comparisons between distance-based classier and hybrid
classier
Table 5.4: Inuence by the number of K-nearest neighbors
K = 5 K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 50 K = 100 K = 200 K = 300
DR 83:94% 84:21% 84:22% 84:29% 84:21% 84:21% 84:21% 83:58%
Acc 76:21% 77:17% 78:48% 79:72% 78:99% 78:56% 78:26% 77:31%
PFR 17:25% 17:25% 16:90% 16:80% 16:97% 17:07% 17:44% 17:52%
NFR 15:16% 14:92% 14:94% 14:88% 14:90% 14:82% 14:77% 15:59%
In conclusion, K-nearest neighbors is rst used to label the data temporarily. It is
necessary because we should know the data is like either normal or intrusion. Step 2
uses the centroids of normal and intrusion to decide the centroids of anomaly. Because
most of anomaly intrusions are like normal or intrusion and not like normal or intrusion,
too. That means the distance between anomaly intrusion and normal(or intrusion) is
not so near and not so far. So, this is the important reason that detection performance
is improved in this method.
5.5.2 Comparisons with Other Methods
The proposed method belongs to the supervised learning for classication. Therefore,
the proposed classier is only compared with two classical supervised methods, where
Multi-Layer Perceptron is a basic neural network method, while Support Vector Ma-
chine is an active machine learning method in recent years for solving a variety of
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regression and classication.
Figure 5.8: DR and ACC comparisons among distance-based classier, SVM and MLP
Figure 5.9: PFR and NFR comparisons among distance-based classier, SVM and MLP
Support Vector Machine(SVM) has been widely used for IDS as a classical patter
recognition technique. In this method, the average matching degrees mN and mI over
all training data are regarded as the inputs of SVM, while the output is the similarity
probability of the test data to normal patterns or misuse intrusion patterns. If the
test data has higher similarity probability to normal patterns than misuse intrusion
patterns by a certain value, we regard it as normal, while if the test data has higher
similarity probability to misuse intrusion patterns than normal patterns by a certain
value, it is regarded as misuse intrusion. Otherwise, it is classied as anomaly intrusion.
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The Libsvm(106) tool is used to perform the simulations with SVM. As the simula-
tion parameters of SVM, C-SVC SVM algorithm is used, i.e., selected the radial basis
function as the kernel type and used other relevant default parameters.
Multi Layer Perceptron(MLP) is one of the most commonly used neural networks for
classication. The architecture used for MLP consists of four layers, i.e., two inputs,
two hidden layers(ve nodes in each layer) and one output. The average matching
degrees mN and mI over all training data are also used as its inputs to train the
MLP classier. Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9 show the comparisons among the Distance-based
classication, SVM and MLP in terms of DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR.
From the aforementioned comparisons, the performance is improved by the distance-
based classier due to that misuse intrusions can be detected accurately, at the same
time, the detection of anomaly intrusions is reasonable and eective to most of the
anomaly intrusion data. Moreover, the proposed classier provides more accurate in-
formation without parameter tuning, whereas, it is necessary to select appropriate
parameters to build the classier using SVM or MLP.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a two-step Distance-based classication method has been proposed
using the average matching degree of the connection data with rules. To evaluate the
performance of the proposed method, both original KDDCup 1999 data set and NSL-
KDD data set which removed redundant records from KDD Cup 1999 are simulated
to increase the level of diculty. It has been claried from simulation results that the
proposed Distance-based classier can get higher DR and Accuracy, and lower PFR
and almost similar NFR to the hybrid intrusion detection classier. In addition, it is
found that DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR are not so sensitive to K. The proposed
classier is also compared with other two well-known methods. The results show the
proposed one has better performance. It is remarkable that the proposed classier can
detect all the connection data of neptune type and smurf type in the test set of KDD
Cup 1999.
On the other hand, the detection of anomaly intrusions still has room for improve-
ment. As is known, anomaly intrusions are actually similar to normal or intrusion
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behaviors. In order to make full use of normal and misuse intrusion patterns, it is
essential to nd the exact boundary of normal and misuse intrusion patterns.
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6Classication for Intrusion
Detection System using Gaussian
Functions
Anomaly detection is an important problem that has been studied within diverse re-
search areas and application domains, especially for computer security(14). Finding
the hardest-to-detect anomalies is the most critical task in intrusion detection.
In the hybrid framework of the intrusion detection system, it is easy to get good per-
formance when identifying the misuse intrusions from normal data. Whereas, anomaly
intrusions are usually dicult to identify because of its no patterns. Traditional detec-
tion method of anomaly intrusions relies on normal patterns. However, in reality, the
behaviors of normal connection data are too diverse to gather completely. Therefore, if
the types of both normal behaviors and misuse intrusion behaviors are considered and
the boundary of each type of behaviors is found, then it becomes simple to identify a
new connection as normal or intrusion.
6.1 Introduction
It is crucial to adopt an appropriate classication approach for intrusion detection
systems. Probabilistic classication proposed in (79) assumes that the normal class and
misuse intrusion class are independent to estimate the two one dimensional probability
density functions which represent the distribution of the data of the normal class and
misuse intrusion class, respectively. However, in the eld of intrusion detection, the
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probability density functions of the normal class and misuse intrusion class are usually
correlated.
In distance-based classication(107), known information of normal and intrusion is
used to determine the possible regions of anomaly intrusions. Centroids of anomaly
intrusions are dened by normal centroid and intrusion centroid. However, anomaly
intrusions are still dicult to distinguish because some of them are close too much to
normal or known intrusions. Therefore, it is feasible to identify an anomaly intrusion
if the exact boundaries of normal and known intrusions can be found.
In this chapter, a new approach is proposed to nd such the boundaries of normal
and known intrusions. In order to make full use of known information about normal and
known intrusions, it is essential to group the similar data into the same cluster, which
means they have similar behaviors. Then, the problem becomes nding exact boundary
for each cluster. This method intends to solve two points. One is the appropriate
number of clusters. The other is the determination of the boundary for each cluster.
The advantages of the new proposed classication approach are summarized in the
following.
1. Both normal and misuse intrusion contain more than one type of behaviors. The
clustering is used to gather similar patterns in one cluster automatically.
2. A new clustering method is used by dividing the average matching degree space
into many blocks. Each block corresponds to a cluster.
3. Gaussian function is used to decide the boundary of the cluster. Each cluster has
its own Gaussian function. All of the Gaussian functions are dierent with each
other.
4. The center of the cluster equals to the center of its Gaussian function. The bound-
ary of the cluster is decided by GA considering its classication performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives the motivations
of the proposed method. Section 6.3 describes the new classication method using
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clustering and Gaussian functions. Simulations are shown in Section 6.4. Finally, the
summary is concluded in Section 6.5.
6.2 Motivations
Classication represents a widely studied domain. Currently, in most of the machine
learning approaches, solutions still generally take the form of a single classier per
class. However, there are too many patterns existing in normal and misuse intrusion
connection data for intrusion detection. Even though no classier can model too many
behaviors, it is appropriate to build a classier for a cluster of similar behaviors. Hence,
the two issues come out. One is how to decide the clusters for the behaviors of the
training space. The other is what kind of model is used to build the classier. Here,
more attention should be paid to one phenomenon. When the distance-based classi-
cation approach is used, the detection performance showed that the anomaly intrusion
connection data was easily identied as normal or misuse intrusion, while the part of
normal connection data was identied as anomaly intrusion, which resulted in high
PFR. The solution of the misclassied parts is an important factor to improve detec-
tion performance. Where are the misclassied parts from? Because all normal data are
considered as one cluster and all intrusion data are considered as one cluster. It is not
exact because both normal data and intrusion data belong to more than one cluster.
Each cluster is supposed to obey the gaussian distribution since gaussian distri-
bution is a common hypothesis in all the data analysis. Moreover, Gaussian function
conforms to requirement of this research. The shape of it can be controlled by the
parameters of Gaussian function. The location of the data in average matching degree
space can be mapped to the score which means how much the data belongs to this
Gaussian function.
6.3 Classication using Gaussian Functions
Dierent from many other classication applications, IDS is special since it aims at
detecting not only the connections with known patterns, but also those without attack
signatures. The accurate detection of anomaly intrusions can reduce NFR and PFR,
and improve Accuracy of IDS. However, due to the lack of the patterns of anomaly
intrusions, it is dicult to detect anomaly intrusions from the mixture of normal and
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misuse intrusions. In order to keep IDS work well, the precise detection of anomaly
intrusions is essential for extracting useful patterns from brand new intrusions.
Figure 6.1: Determination of clusters
6.3.1 Clustering Network Behaviors
In this section, we will explain how to determine each cluster. Dierent from K-means
clustering approach, the proposed approach uses the distribution of the average match-
ing degrees to dene the clusters.
The basic idea is to segment the two-dimensional space of the average matching
degree corresponding to the normal class (mN (d)) and misuse intrusion class (mI(d))
into many blocks as shown in Fig. 6.1. Naturally, the average matching degrees fall into
dierent blocks by their coordinates. It is shown from Fig. 6.1 that the points of the
average matching degrees of the training data in some blocks are dispersed and those of
other blocks are crowded. Then, the crowded ones are regarded as clusters. In Fig. 6.1,
blue points represent the average matching degrees labeled as normal, while red ones
represent those labeled as misuse intrusion. Block A and B contain more points of
misuse intrusion than the minimum number of points in a block, while block C and D
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contain more normal points than the minimum number of points in a block. Therefore,
A, B, C and D correspond to the clusters.
6.3.2 Classication Model based on Gaussian Functions
Each cluster has a single Gaussian function, whose center equals the center of the
corresponding block. In the proposed method, the following two-dimensional Gaussian
function is used.
f(mN ;mI) = Ae
 (a(mN N )2+b(mN N )(mI I)+c(mI I)2); (6.1)
where, coecient A is an amplitude, (N ; I) is the center of the cluster corresponding
to the coordinates of normal and misuse intrusion in the two dimensional average
matching degree space, a, b and c are the parameters of the Gaussian function to
adjust. In this application, A is set at 1. Therefore, the values of Gaussian functions
range from 0 to 1.
Figure 6.2: A single Gaussian function
Fig. 6.2 shows a single Gaussian function. If the average matching degree (mN ;mI)
of a new connection data is close to the center of the cluster, the corresponding Gaussian
function can have a high value. Then, threshold  is used to evaluate how much
a new connection data is close to the class of the corresponding Gaussian function.
fc(mN ;mI) in Fig. 6.2 denotes the value of a Gaussian function for a new connection
data. If fc(mN ;mI) is larger than threshold , a new connection data has the same
class label as that of the corresponding Gaussian function.
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Actually, both the normal class and misuse intrusion class contain more than one
Gaussian function. GV (mN ;mI) is calculated by the following equation,
GV (mN ;mI) = maxff1(mN ;mI); :::; fc(mN ;mI); :::; fC(mN ;mI)g; (6.2)
where, c 2 C is the cluster number and its set for normal or misuse intrusions. Then,
GV (mN ;mI) is actually like a score which is used to determine the class of a new
connection data as shown in Fig. 6.3, where GVN and GVI are the gaussian value for
normal and misuse intrusion, respectively. Step 1 identies whether a new connection
data belongs to normal or not. In step 2, the class of a new connection data can
be determined using threshold . In this chapter, threshold  of normal and misuse
intrusions equals to 0:99.
Figure 6.3: Classication procedure
Though the centers of Gaussian functions are determined, another problem is to
determine the shape of Gaussian functions. In the two-dimensional average matching
degree space, parameter a, b and c of Gaussian functions are used to determine the
appropriate boundary of each cluster.
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6.3.3 Boundary Estimation by GA
In the proposed method, GA is used to nd the optimal a, b and c of each Gaussian
function. In order to balance the exploitation and exploration and alleviate the pre-
mature convergence, non-uniform mutation and blend crossover are used in GA. The
following tness function is used to evaluate the performance of each individual.
fitness =  ACC     PFR   NFR; (6.3)
where, ACC is the classication accuracy by the set of Gaussian functions. PFR is
positive false rate and NFR is negative false rate. The individuals are ordered by
their tness values. Better individuals are selected to do crossover and mutation by
tournament selection. As crossover operator, blend crossover BLX    is used. As
usual, individual x1 and x2 are selected as parents. Each element xci of individual x
c
(c 2 f1; 2g) of the ospring is chosen from the interval [X1i ; X2i ] with the crossover rate.
X1i = min(x
1
i ; x
2
i )  di; (6.4)
X2i = max(x
1
i ; x
2
i )  di; (6.5)
di = jx1i   x2i j; (6.6)
where,  is a positive parameter.
Non-uniform mutation is also used as the mutation operator. For each individual
x in a certain generation, the individual x0 in the next generation will be generated as
follows. (
x
0
k = xk +4(t; UB   xk); if random variable  is 0;
x
0
k = xk  4(t; xk   LB); if random variable  is 1;
(6.7)
4(t; y) = y  (1  r1  tT ); (6.8)
where, xk is the kth component of individual x and LB and UB are the lower and
upper bounds of xk. 4(t; y) returns a value from [0; y]. r is a uniform random value in
the range of [0; 1] and T is maximal generation.
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6.4 Simulations
6.4.1 Training Phase
In this chapter, we use training data set randomly selected from NSL-KDD for Fuzzy
GNP-based class association rule mining, that is, the same as that of last chapter. It
contains 2; 000 normal connections and 2; 000 misuse intrusion connections consisting
of 1; 500 with neptune type and 500 with smurf type.
As the number of rules is too large to build the classier, the two-phase rule pruning
mechanism is implemented to pick up useful rules and to reduce the inuence from
redundant and irrelevant rules in the rule pool. As a result, it remains only 429 normal
rules, 437 misuse intrusion rules with neptune type and 134 misuse intrusion rules with
smurf type after pruning.
6.4.2 Selection of Parameters
In the proposed approach, there are two sets of parameters to be determined. One
is the minimum number of points in one block for determining the crowdness of the
block. The other is the parameters of the tness functions in GA. The simulations for
setting the above two sets of parameters are conducted using the validation data, which
contains 2; 000 normal connections, 2; 000 misuse intrusion connections, including 1; 000
neptune and 1; 000 smurf .
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Figure 6.4: The performance with various size of points in the block
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Table 6.1: Number of clusters in normal and misuse intrusion class which is obtained by
various size of points in the block
setting CN CI
1 224 92
2 132 92
3 99 92
4 71 92
5 57 92
6 51 92
7 27 92
8 25 92
9 57 76
10 57 67
11 57 59
12 57 55
13 57 36
14 57 18
First, the eects of dierent size of points in the cluster are analyzed. For this
purpose, each parameter of the tness function is set at 1. Fig. 6.4 shows DR and
Accuracy, PFR and NFR on dierent size of points, while Table 6.1 shows the cor-
responding number of clusters in the normal and misuse class, which was used for
calculating Fig. 6.4. Setting 1 5 indicate that, as the number of clusters in the normal
class decreases, DR, Accuracy and NFR are improved although PFR increases. If the
number of clusters decreases too much, DR and Accuracy also decrease, and NFR is
not improved any more, but PFR is still increasing, which is shown at setting 6   8
in Fig. 6.4. So, the number of clusters in the normal class is xed at 57 like setting
5 and the eect of the setting in the misuse intrusion class is examined. Setting 9
indicates that DR and Accuracy increase, and PFR and NFR decrease. However, as
the number of clusters in the misuse intrusion decreases, the performance of Accuracy
decreases a lot. It is concluded from Fig. 6.4 that an appropriate number of clusters
(neither large nor small) can improve the performance of intrusion detection system to
some extent.
Next, the eects of the parameters of the tness function are analyzed under the
number of clusters with setting 9. They are also evolved by GA on validation data.
Fig. 6.5 shows DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR on dierent parameter settings, while
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Table 6.2 shows the corresponding weight settings. When setting  (PFR) and  (NFR)
at small values, DR, Accuracy and NFR are worse than those in the case of setting
3 although PFR is a bit better. As  (Accuracy) increases, the performance does not
become better, even worse. So,  is increased after  is set at 1. Then, DR, Accuracy
and PFR are deteriorated in setting 7   8. Thus,  is set at 4. Then, increasing 
brings the increase of DR and Accuracy and decrease of PFR and NFR. But, DR,
Accuracy and NFR become worse by increasing  too much, though PFR has no big
change. Therefore, setting 9 is selected.
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ects of tness parameter settings
6.4.3 Classication using Gaussian Functions
After determining the shape of Gaussian functions, it can projected on the average
matching degree space. Fig. 6.6 shows an example of the shapes of Gaussian functions
for three clusters. Two of them belong to the misuse intrusion class like A and B in
Fig. 6.6 and one is the normal class like C in Fig. 6.6. As Fig. 6.6 shows, the shapes
are ellipse or circle and the boundaries of the classes are dierent with each other.
Table 6.3 shows the classication results using Gaussian functions using setting 9
in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. In Table 6.3, Normal(C), Misuse(C) and Anomaly(C)
indicate the number of normal, misuse intrusions and anomaly intrusions labeled by the
classication with Gaussian functions, respectively, while Normal(A), Misuse(A) and
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Table 6.2: Fitness parameter settings
setting   
1 1 0:5 1
2 1 0:5 0:5
3 1 1 1
4 2 1 1
5 5 1 1
6 1 1 4
7 1 1 5
8 1 1 7
9 1 2 4
10 1 5 4
11 1 7 4
12 1 8 4
Figure 6.6: An example of the shapes of Gaussian functions in average matching degree
space
Anomaly(A) indicate the actual number of normal, misuse intrusions and anomaly
intrusions, respectively. It is obvious that most of the anomaly intrusion data can
be detected by the proposed classier, which means it has better detection ability on
anomaly intrusions.
According to Table 6.3, DR, Accuracy, PFR and NFR are calculated as shown in
Eq.( 6.9)( 6.12).
DR = (8; 616 + 5; 036 + 5; 320 + 402 + 283)=22; 544 = 87:19% (6.9)
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Table 6.3: Results of classication with Gaussian functions
Normal(C) Misuse(C) Anomaly(C) Total
Normal(A) 8; 616 61 1; 034 9; 711
Misuse(A) 3 5; 036 283 5; 322
Anomaly(A) 1; 789 402 5; 320 7; 511
Total 10; 408 5; 499 6; 637 22; 544
Accuracy = (8; 616 + 5; 036 + 5; 320)=22; 544 = 84:16% (6.10)
PFR = (61 + 1; 034)=9; 711 = 11:28% (6.11)
NFR = (3 + 1; 789)=(5; 322 + 7; 511) = 13:96% (6.12)
Over 70% of anomaly intrusion connection data has been detected. Specially, the num-
ber of anomaly intrusion connection data misclassied as misuse intrusion is very small.
At the same time, the number of normal connection data misclassied is acceptable.
6.4.4 Comparison with Other Approaches
For comparison, the same NSL-KDD data set is used to do the simulations for com-
paring the proposed method with other approaches.
One is of the most commonly used neural networks for classication. The archi-
tecture used for MLP consists of four layers, i.e., two inputs, two hidden layers(ve
nodes in each layer) and one output. The average matching degrees mN (d) and mI(d)
over all training data are also used as the inputs to train the MLP classier. Fig. 6.7
and Fig. 6.8 show the comparisons of the proposed method with the Distance-based
classication, Hybrid classier, SVM and MLP in terms of DR, Accuracy, PFR and
NFR.
From the aforementioned comparisons, the performance is improved by the proposed
classier due to the improved detection ability of anomaly intrusion. The proposed
method can distinguish normal and anomaly intrusion better than other algorithms.
At the same time, it is also eective to detect the misuse intrusion.
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6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a novel approach is proposed to classify network connections. By
distributing the clusters with Gaussian functions, the proposed method can classify a
new connection data as normal, misuse intrusion or anomaly intrusion fairly correctly.
Most importantly, the proposed approach gathers the similar behaviors as a cluster and
builds the Gaussian function for each cluster, where the clustering provides essential
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parameters of Gaussian functions and the shapes of Gaussian function are used as the
boundary of the cluster. Furthermore, GA is used to decide the shapes of Gaussian
functions. The simulation results conducted on NSL-KDD data set show that the de-
tection performance is improved by the proposed method. The comparisons with other
approaches indicate that the proposed approach has excellent DR and Acuuracy. Es-
pecially, the proposed method can distinguish normal and anomaly intrusion correctly
comparing with Distance-based approach.
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In this thesis, a series of data mining methods is proposed for building an ecient in-
trusion detection system. Intrusion detection systems are analyzed from three aspects:
class association rule mining, class association rule pruning and classication.
In chapter 2, a hybrid framework of intrusion detection systems has been proposed
to combine the advantages of both misuse detection and anomaly detection. In this
system, GNP undertakes extracting class association rules. And it can extract many in-
teresting and important class association rules from network connection data eciently
by using the sub-attributes based on information gain. Information gain can avoid the
information loss as much as possible, which can deal with the partition of continuous
attributes. These rules are evaluated by the average matching degree of the data with
rules. In this way, multi-dimensional data space is converted into a two-dimensional
space. A classier combined misuse detection and anomaly detection has been also
proposed by utilizing the average matching degree to classify the new data. By comb-
ing misuse detection and anomaly detection, the results show the proposed system has
better performance.
However, two problems came out. One is that too many rules brought much use-
less information into the rule pool and waste much processing time during classica-
tion. In this case, a pruning method is needed to reduce the useless rules from the
rule pool. Second is that information gain avoided the loss of much information, but
the discretization of the continuous attributes into intervals leaded to sharp bound-
ary problem. Therefore, in chapter 3 and 4, we focused on solving the two problems,
respectively.
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Chapter 3 proposed an ecient class association rule pruning method. This rule
pruning method has two stages. The rst stage can pre-prune the rules to improve the
eciency of the second step. The second step implemented GA to pick up a small set
of eective rules among remaining rules in the rst stage. The simulation results show
that the proposed two-stage rule pruning method can improve the detection ability of
intrusion detection system under a small set of class association rules.
Chapter 4 proposed Fuzzy GNP to extract class association rule. Comparing with
conventional GNP, Fuzzy GNP can deal with both discrete and continuous attributes in
intrusion detection and overtake the sharp boundary problem of sub-attributes method.
Each continuous attribute had its own initial fuzzy membership function and its pa-
rameters were evolved along with the GNP evolution. In addition, probabilistic node
transition has taken place in the traditional node transition in GNP, which can con-
tribute to extracting diversied rules. The simulation results on KDD Cup 1999 show
good detection ability. And Fuzzy GNP can extract more useful rules than conventional
GNP.
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 analyzed the classier for an eective intrusion detection
system.
Chapter 5 proposed a Distance-based classication method. Firstly, K-closest neigh-
bor classier was employed to categorize each new data into either normal or misuse
intrusion. Then, the centroids of anomaly intrusion data were dened by the centroids
of normal data and misuse intrusion data. Distance-based classication method can
distinguish anomaly intrusions from the mixture of normal and misuse intrusions more
accurately than other methods. The results on NSL-KDD data set indicate that the
detection ability of anomaly intrusions has been improved. From the results on KDD
Cup 1999 data set, it is remarkable that the Distance-based classier can detect all
the connection data of neptune type and smurf type with known patterns. And the
detection performance of this classier is not sensitive to parameter K.
Chapter 6 proposed a new classier using Gaussian functions and clustering method.
To make full use of normal and misuse intrusion patterns, the proposed method has
grouped the similar patterns into the same cluster. Then Gaussian function has been
used to look for the boundary for each cluster. GA was used to decide the shapes
of Gaussian functions. This classier can classify the new connection data as normal,
misuse intrusion or anomaly intrusion fairly correctly. The proposed method has high
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detection performance. Especially, it can distinguish normal and anomaly intrusion
well.
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Appendix A
Genetic Network
Programming(GNP)
A.1 Structure of GNP
As one of evolutionary algorithms(EA)(108)(109), GNP has been proposed as an exten-
sion of Genetic Algorithm (GA)(110) and Genetic Programming (GP)(111) in terms of
gene structures. GNP uses directed-graphs as genes, whereas GA uses binary strings
and GP uses trees. The original motivation for developing GNP is based on the more
general representation ability of graphs compared with that of strings in GA or trees
in GP in dynamic environment.(112)(113)(114)
As Fig. A.1 shows, one GNP individual is composed of one start node, plural judg-
ment nodes and processing nodes. Start node has no function and no conditional
branch. The only role of the start node is to determine the rst node to be executed.
Judgment nodes judge the information from the environments and determine what the
next node is. Processing nodes describe action/processing functions of GNP. In con-
trast to judgment nodes, processing nodes have no conditional branch. By separating
processing and judgment functions, various combinations of judgment and processing
can be handled by GNP. That is, the tness of dierent combinations of judgment and
processing functions in GNP can be evaluated through the process of evolution.
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Figure A.1: Basic structure of GNP
A.2 Operators of GNP
GNP are also evolved by performing genetic operators, e.g., selection, crossover and
mutation.(112)
1. Selection: The purpose of selection operator is to select individuals according to
their tness. In Fig. A.2, some selection mechanisms are shown.
(a) Roulette Selection: The probability that individuals are selected is propor-
tional to their tness values.
(b) Tournament Selection: First, a subset of population is randomly selected for
tournament selection. Then, the winner individual in this subset is chosen
as the selected individual.
(c) Elite Selection: The best individual of population is selected.
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Figure A.2: Selection methods in GNP
2. Crossover: Crossover is executed between two parents and generates two ospring.
Two parents individuals are rstly selected using selection mechanism. Then,
each node i is selected as a crossover node with the probability of Pc(0  Pc  1).
The value of Pc determines the exploration ability of GNP. Thirdly, two parents
exchange the genes of the corresponding crossover nodes. Finally, generated new
individuals become the new ones of the next generation. In Fig. A.3, a crossover
example of GNP is shown. The red parts of parents are exchanged in ospring
after crossover operation.
Figure A.3: Crossover in GNP
3. Mutation: Mutation is executed in one individual and a new one is generated.
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In detail, one individual is rstly selected as a parent for mutation using selec-
tion mechanism. Secondly, each node i is selected as a mutation node with the
probability of Pm(0  Pm  1). Finally, the contents of selected nodes and their
connections are changed randomly. The purpose of mutation is to nd the global
optimal solution instead of the local optimal solution. In Fig. A.4, a mutation
example of GNP is shown. The red part in the parent is randomly changed to
other value.
Figure A.4: Mutation in GNP
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Class Association Rule Mining
B.1 Association Rule Mining
An association rule is an implication of the form X ) Y , where X  I, Y  I,
and X \ Y = ;. The meaning of this association rule is that if the antecedent X is
satised, then the consequent Y is also satised. It is easy to extract a large number
of candidate association rules. How to evaluate the rules is a key point. Therefore,
interestingness measures are used to select interesting association rules from the set
of candidate rules. For a given rule X ) Y , various measures are devised using the
frequency counts as show in the Table B.1, i.e., Support, Condence, 2 value and etc.
In Table B.1, N means the total number of records. nX is the number of records where
X is satised, while n X means the number of records where X is not satised, and the
corresponding notions of Y are dened in the same way. The rate of tuples satisfying X
in the training database is called the support of X, denoted by support(X) = nXY =N .
The condence of rule X ) Y is dened as the ratio of support(X [ Y )=support(X),
denoted by confidence(X ) Y ) = nXY =nX .
Table B.1: The Frequency counts table of X and Y
Y Y Total
X nXY nX Y nX
X n XY n X Y n X
Total nY n Y N
Assume support(X) = x, support(Y ) = y, support(X [ Y ) = z and the total
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number of tuples in training database is N , then the 2 value of rule X ) Y can be
calculated as
2 =
N(z   xy)2
xy(1  x)(1  y) : (B.1)
If the 2 value is higher than a predened threshold, the assumption that X and
Y are dependent should be accepted. (3.84 at the 95% signicance level or 6.64 at the
99% signicance level).
Class Association Rule has the dierent form with association rule. It has a class
label as its consequent part. The following shows an example of a class association rule.
(Am = 1) ^    ^ (An = 1)) (k 2 C); (B.2)
where Ai is an attribute of database with value 1 or 0 (1 means satised, 0 means not
satised), k is the class label and C is the set of suxes of classes. Class association rule
can be viewed as a special case of the association rule X ) Y with a xed consequent.
B.2 Class Association Rule Mining using GNP
In GNP-based Class Association Rule Mining, attributes and their values of rules cor-
respond to the functions of judgment nodes in GNP. And the connection of judgment
nodes can represent candidate class association rules. An example of the GNP rep-
resentation is displayed in Fig. B.1. Processing node P1 serves as the beginning of
class association rules. A1 = 1, A2 = 1 and A3 = 1 denote the functions of judgment
nodes J1, J2 and J3 respectively. For example, the candidate class association rules,
such as (A1 = 1) ) (C 2 k), (A1 = 1) ^ (A2 = 1) ) (C 2 k) and so on, can be
represented by GNP in Fig. B.1. In Fig. B.1, N indicates the number of total tuples
in the training database; a , b and c are the numbers of tuples moving to the Yes-side
at each judgment node; a(k), b(k) and c(k)are the numbers of tuples moving to the
Yes-side at each judgment node under the condition of belonging to class k. Assume
the number of tuples belonging to class k is y(k), which can be calculated by counting
the number of tuples in the training database that have a class label k, then value of
2 value, support value and condence value of classication rule (A1)) (C 2 k) can
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be calculated as follows in Eq.(B.3)-(B.5):
support((A1)) (C 2 k)) = a
N
; (B.3)
confidence((A1)) (C 2 k)) = a(k)
a
; (B.4)
2 =
N(a(k)  ay(k)=N)2
ay(k)(1  a=N)(1  y(k)=N) : (B.5)
Figure B.1: GNP representation of class association rules
106
References
[1] F. Cohen. Computer Viruses: Theory and Experiments. In Proc. of the 7th DOD/NBS
Computer Security Conference, pages 240{263, 1984.
[2] M. Bishop. Computer Security in the Future. The ISC International Journal of Information
Security, 3(1):3{27, 2011.
[3] SANS. SANS Institute-Intrusion Detection FAQ http://www.sans.org/resources/idfag/, 2012.
[4] B. Mukherjee, L. T. Heberlein, and K. N. Levitt. Network intrusion detection. Network,
IEEE, 8(3):26{41, 1994.
[5] M. Bishop. Introduction to Computer Security. Addison Wesley Professional, 2004.
[6] ISC. The ISC Domain Survey. https://www.isc.org/solutions/survey/, 2012.
[7] P. Lyman, H. R. Varian, P. Charles, N. Good, L. L. Jordan, J. Pal, and K. Swearingen.
How much Information. http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003,
2003.
[8] K. Hwang, Y. Chen, and H. Liu. Defending Distributed Computing Systems from
Malicious Intrusions and Network Anomalies. In Proc. of the 19th IEEE International
Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2005.
[9] K. Hwang, Y. Kwok, S. Song, M. Cai, Y. Chen, and Y. Chen. DHT-Based Security
Infrastructure for Trusted Internet and Grid Computing. International Journal Of Critical
Infrastructures, 2(4):412{433, 2006.
[10] Z. Yu, J. J. P. Tsai, and T. Weigert. An Automatically Tuning Intrusion Detection
System. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, 37(2):373{
384, 2007.
[11] A. Sundaram. An Introduction to Intrusion Detection. Special Issue on Computer Security,
2(4):3{7, 1996.
[12] R. A. Kemmerer. Intrusion Detection: A Brief History and Overview. Computer,
35(4):27{30, 2002.
[13] O. Depren, M. Topallar, E. Anarim, and M. K. Ciliz. An Intelligent Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS) for Anomaly and Misuse detection in Computer Networks. Expert
Systems with Applications, 29(4):713-722, 2005.
[14] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar. Anomaly Detection: A Survey. ACM
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 41(3), 2009.
107
REFERENCES
[15] A. Patcha and J. M. Park. An Overview of Anomaly Detection Techniques: Existing
Solutions and Latest Technological Trends. Computer Networks, 51(12):3448-3470, 2007.
[16] J. Hu, X. Yu, D. Qiu, and H. H. Chen. A Simple and Ecient Hidden Markov Model
Scheme for Host-based Anomaly Intrusion Detection. Network, IEEE, 23(1):42{47, 2009.
[17] D. Y. Yeung and Y. Ding. Host-based Intrusion Detection using Dynamic and Static
Behavioral Models. Pattern Recognition, 36(1):229-243, 2003.
[18] L. Vokorokos and A. Balaz. Host-based Intrusion Detection System. In Proc. of the
14th International Conference on Intelligent Engineering Systems (INES), pages 43{47, 2010.
[19] D. Mutz, F. Valeur, G. Vigna, and C. Kruegel. Anomalous System Call Detection.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 9(1):61{93, 2006.
[20] W. Hu, W. Hu, and S. Maybank. AdaBoost-Based Algorithm for Network Intru-
sion Detection. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics,
38(2):577{583, 2008.
[21] S. Chebrolu, A. Abraham, and J. P. Thomas. Feature Deduction and Ensemble Design
of Intrusion Detection Systems. Computer and Security, 24(4):295{307, 2005.
[22] D. Wagner and P. Soto. Mimicry Attacks on Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems.
In Proc. of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 255{264,
2002.
[23] G. Vigna and R. A. Kemmerer. NetSTAT: A Network-based Intrusion Detection Ap-
proach. In Proc. of the 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 25{34,
1998.
[24] J. Zhang, M. Zulkernine, and A. Haque. Random-Forests-Based Network Intrusion
Detection Systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications
and Reviews, 38(5):649{659, 2008.
[25] H. Han, X. Lu, and L. Ren. Using Data Mining to Discover Signatures in Network-
based Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the International Conference on Machine Learning and
Cybernetics, 1:13{17, 2002.
[26] M. Lehtinen and A. C. Lear. Intrusion Detection: Managing the Risk of Connectivity.
IT Professional, 1(6):11{13, 1999.
[27] C. Herringshaw. Detecting Attacks on Networks. Computer, 30(12):16{17, 1997.
[28] D. E. Denning. An Intrusion Detection Model. IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering,
SE-13(2):222{232, 1987.
[29] N. Ye, X. Li, Q. Chen, S. M. Emran, and M. Xu. Probabilistic Techniques for Intru-
sion Detection based on Computer Audit Data. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, 31(4):266{274, 2001.
[30] S. Mabu, C. Chen, N. Lu, K. Shimada, and K. Hirasawa. An Intrusion-Detection
Model Based on Fuzzy Class-Association-Rule Mining Using Genetic Network Pro-
gramming. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and
Reviews, 41(1):130{139, 2011.
[31] K. K. Gupta, B. Nath, and R. Kotagiri. Layered Approach Using Conditional Random
Fields for Intrusion Detectionn. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
7(1):35{49, 2010.
108
REFERENCES
[32] J. P. Anderson. Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance. Technical
report, James P. Anderson Company, Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, 1980.
[33] S. Kumar and E. H. Spafford. Pattern Matching Model for Misuse Intrusion Detection.
In Proc. of the 17th National Computer Security Conference, pages 11{21, 1994.
[34] C. Zhou, Y. Liu, and H. Zhang. A Pattern Matching based Network Intrusion Detec-
tion System. In Proc. of the 9th International Conference on Control, Automation, Robotics and
Vision (ICARCV 06), pages 1{4, 2006.
[35] J. Li and C. Manikopoulos. Early Statistical Anomaly Intrusion Detection of DOS
Attacks using MIB Trac Parameters. Information Assurance Workshop, IEEE Systems,
Man and Cybernetics Society, page 53-59, 2003.
[36] W. Teng, M. Hsieh, and M. Chen. A Statistical Framework for Mining Substitution
Rules. Knowledge and Information Systems, 7(2):158-178, 2005.
[37] W. Lee and D. Xiang. Information-Theoretic Measures for Anomaly Detection. In
Proc. of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 130{143, 2001.
[38] W. Lee, S. Stolfo, P. K. Chan, E. Eskin, W. Fan, M. Miller, S. Hershkop, and J. Zhang.
Real Time Data Mining-based Intrusion Detection. In DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition II, pages 85{100, 2001.
[39] S. T. Brugger. Data Mining Methods for Network Intrusion Detection. UC Davis
Dissertation Proposal, 2004.
[40] P. D. Williams, K. P. Anchor, J. L. Bebo, G. H. Gunsch, and G. D. Lamont. CDIS:
Towards a Computer Immune System for Detecting Network Intrusions. In Proc. of the
4th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 117{133, 2001.
[41] P. Laskov, P. Dssel, C. Schfer, and K. Rieck. Learning Intrusion Detection: Super-
vised or Unsupervised? Image Analysis and ProcessingICIAP 2005 Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 3617/2005:50{57, 2005.
[42] R. Sommer and V. Paxson. Outside the Closed World: on using Machine Learning
for Network Intrusion Detection. 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages
305{316, 2010.
[43] C. Sinclair, L. Pierce, and S. Matzner. An Application of Machine Learning to Net-
work Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the 15th Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference(ACSAC '99), pages 371{377, 1999.
[44] N. Ye, S. M. Emran, X. Li, and Q. Chen. Statistical Process Control for Computer
Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition
II(DISCEX'01), 1:3{14, 2001.
[45] A. Qayyum, M. H. Islam, and M. Jamil. Taxonomy of Statistical based Anomaly De-
tection Techniques for Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Emerging
Technologies, pages 270{276, 2005.
[46] T. Verwoerd and R. Hunt. Intrusion Detection Techniques and Approaches. Computer
Communications, 25(15):1356{1365, 2002.
[47] D. Anderson, T. F. Lunt, H. Javits, A. Tamaru, and A. Valdes. Detecting Unusual
Program Behavior using the Statistics Components of NIDES. NIDES Technical Report,
SRI International, 1995.
109
REFERENCES
[48] J. B. D. Caberera, B. Ravichandran, and R. K. Mehra. Statistical Trac Modeling
for Network Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the 8th International Symposium on Modeling,
Analysis and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems, pages 466{473, 2000.
[49] N. Ye. A Markov Chain Model of Temporal Behavior for Anomaly Detection. In Proc.
of the IEEE SMC Inform. Assurance Security Workshop, pages 166{169, 2000.
[50] A. Kanaoka and E. Okamoto. Multivariate Statistical Analysis of Network Trac
for Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the 14th International Workshop onDatabase and Expert
Systems Applications, pages 472{476, 2003.
[51] N. B. Amor, S. Benferhat, and Z. Elouedi. Naive Bayes vs Decision Tree in Intrusion
Detection. In Proc. of the 2004 ACM symposium on Applied computing, 2004.
[52] S. Mukkamala, G. Janoski, and A. Sung. Intrusion Detection using Neural Networks
and Support Vector Machines. In Proc. of the Int. Joint Conf. Neural Netw., 2:1702{1707,
2002.
[53] A. Rapaka, A. Novokhodko, and D. Wunsch. Intrusion Detection using Radial Basis
Function Network on Sequences of System Calls. In Proc. of Int. Joint Conf. Neural Netw.,
3:1820{1825, 2003.
[54] F. Karray and C. Silva. Soft Computing and Intelligent Systems Design: Theory,
Tools and Applications. Addison Wesley Publishing, 2004.
[55] J. Hertz, A. Krogh, and R. Palmer. Introduction to the Theory of Neural Computa-
tion. Addison Wesley Publishing, 1991.
[56] J. Cannady. Articial Neural Networks for Misuse Detection. In Proc. Of the 1998
National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 443{456, 1998.
[57] D. Parikh and T. Chen. Data Fusion and Cost Minimization for Intrusion Detection.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 3(3):381{389, 2008.
[58] Y. Freund and R. E. Schapire. A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-line Learn-
ing and An Application to Boosting. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 904/1995:23{37,
1995.
[59] L. Portnoy, E. Eskin, and S. Stolfo. Intrusion Detection with Unlabeled Data using
Clustering. In Proc of the ACM Workshop Data Mining Applied to Security(DMSA), 2001.
[60] H. Shah, J. Undercoffer, and A. Joshi. Fuzzy Clustering for Intrusion Detection. In
Proc. of the 12th IEEE Int'l Conf. Fuzzy Systems(FUZZY-IEEE'03), 2:1274{1278, 2003.
[61] A. J. Hoglund, K. Hatonen, and A. S. Sorvari. A Computer Host-based User Anomaly
Detection System using the Self-Organizing Map. In Proc. of Int. Joint Conf. Neural Netw.,
5:411{416, 2000.
[62] H. G. Kayacik, A. N. Zincir-Heywood, and M. I. Heywood. On the Capability of An
SOM based Intrusion Detection System. In Proc. of Int. Joint Conf. Neural Netw., 3:1808{
1813, 2003.
[63] W. Lee and S. J. Stolfo. A Framework for Constructing Features and Models for
Intrusion Detection Systems. ACM Trans. on Information and System Security, 3(4):227{261,
2000.
110
REFERENCES
[64] W. Lee, S. J. Stolfo, and K. W. Mok. Mining Audit Data to Build Intrusion Detection
Models. In Proc. of the ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data mining, pages 66{72, 1998.
[65] L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy Logic, Neural Networks, and Soft Somputing. Communications of
the ACM, 37(3):77{84, 1994.
[66] J. E. Dickerson, J. Juslin, O. Koukousoula, and J. A. Dickerson. Fuzzy Intrusion
Detection. IFSA World Congress and 20th NAFIPS International Conference, 3:1506{1510, 2001.
[67] A. Tajbakhsh, M. Rahmati, and A. Mirzaei. Intrusion Detection using Fuzzy Associa-
tion Rules. Applied Soft Computing, 9(2):462{469, 2009.
[68] D. E. Goldberg. Genetic Algorithm in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning.
Addison-Wesley, 1989.
[69] K. Shazzad and J. Park. Optimization of Intrusion Detection through Fast Hybrid
Feature Selection. In Proc. of the Sixth International Conference on Parallel and Distributed
Computing Applications and Technologies, page 264-267, 2005.
[70] A. Hofmann, T. Horeis, and B. Sick. Feature Selection for Intrusion Detection: An
Evolutionary Wrapper Approach. In Proc. of the 2004 IEEE International Joint Conference
on Neural Networks, 2:1563{1568, 2004.
[71] D. Kim, H. Nguyen, and J. Park. Genetic Algorithm to Improve SVM Based Net-
work Intrusion Detection System. In Proc. of the 19th International Conference on Advanced
Information Networking and Applications, page 155-158, 2005.
[72] T. Hong, C. Chen, Y. Lee, and Y. Wu. Genetic-Fuzzy Data Mining with Divide-and-
Conquer Strategy. IEEE Trans. on Evolutionary Computation, 12(2):252{265, 2008.
[73] M. J. Zaki. Generating Non-redundant Association Rules. In Proc. of the sixth ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 34{43, 2000.
[74] M. Kryszkiewicz. Representative Association Rules and Minimum Condition Maxi-
mum Consequence Association Rules. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1510/1998:361{
369, 1998.
[75] J. Li, H. Shen, and R. Topor. Mining the Optimal Class Association Rule Set.
Knowledge-based Systems, 15(7):399{405, 2002.
[76] B. Lent, A. Swami, and J. Widom. Clustering Association Rules. In proc. of the 13th
International Conference on Data Engineering, pages 220{231, 1997.
[77] G. Folino, C. Pizzuti, and G. Spezzano. GP Ensemble for Distributed Intrusion De-
tection Systems. Pattern Recognition and Data Mining Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
3686/2005:54{62, 2005.
[78] K. Hirasawa, M. Okubo, H. Katagiri, J. Hu, and J. Murata. Comparison Between
Genetic Network Programming (GNP) and Genetic Programming(GP). In Proc. of the
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, pages 1276{1282, 2001.
[79] N. Lu, S. Mabu, and K. Hirasawa. Integrated Rule Mining based on Fuzzy GNP and
Probabilistic Classication for Intrusion Detection. Journal of Advanced Computational
Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics, 15(5), 2011.
111
REFERENCES
[80] G. B. White, E. A. Fisch, and U. W. Pooch. Cooperating Security Managers: A
Peer-Based Intrusion Detection System. Network, IEEE, 10(1):20{23, 1996.
[81] E. Eskin, A. Arnold, M. Prerau, L. Portnoy, and S. Stolfo. A Geometric Frame-
work for Unsupervised Anomaly Detection: Detecting Intrusions in Unlabeled Data.
Applications of Data Mining in Computer Security, 2002.
[82] W. Fan, M. Miller, S. Stolfo, W. Lee, and P. Chan. Using Articial Anomalies to
Detect Unknown and Known Network Intrusions. Knowledge and Information Systems,
6(5):507{527, 2004.
[83] K. S. Killourhy and R. A. Maxion. Undermining an Anomaly-based Intrusion Detec-
tion System Using Common Exploits. In Proc. of the 5th International Conference on Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 54{73, 2002.
[84] D. Barbar, J. Couto, S. Jajodia, L. Popyack, and N. Wu. ADAM: Detecting Intrusions
by Data Mining. In Proc. of the IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security, pages
11{16, 2001.
[85] KDD Cup 1999. Intrusion Detection Data. http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99.
[86] S. J. Stolfo, W. Fan, W. Lee, A. Prodromidis, and P. K. Chan. Cost based Modeling
for Fraud and Intrusion Detection: Results from the Jam Project. In Proc. of DARPA
Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 2:130{144, 2000.
[87] K. Shimada, K. Hirasawa, and J. Hu. Class Association Rule Mining with Chi-Squared
Test Using Genetic Network Programming. IEEE International Conference on Systems,
Man and Cybernetics, 6:5338{5344, 2006.
[88] B. Liu, W. Hsu, and Y. Ma. Integrating Classication and Association Rule Mining.
In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
pages 80{86, 1998.
[89] H. Ishibuchi, T. Nakashima, and T. Morisawa. Voting in Fuzzy Rule-based Systems for
Pattern Classication Problems. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 103(2):223{238, 1999.
[90] H. Ishibuchi and T. Yamamotoa. Rule Weight Specication in Fuzzy Rule-Based Clas-
sication Systems. IEEE Trans. on Fuzzy Systems, 13(4):428{435, 2005.
[91] L. Geng. Interestingness Measures for Data Mining: A Survey. ACM Computing Surveys,
383:1{32, 2006.
[92] H. Toivonen, M. Klemettinen, P. Ronkainen, and H. Manilla. Pruning and Grouping
Discovered Association Rules. In Workshop on Statistics, Machine Learning and Knowledge
Discovery in Databases, pages 47{52, 1995.
[93] P. N. Tan, V. Kumar, and J. Srivastava. Selecting the Right Interestingness Measure
for Association Patterns. In Proc. of the 8th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 32{41, 2002.
[94] E. Gonzales, Shingo S. Mabu, K. Taboada, K. Shimada, and K. Hirasawa. Ecient
Pruning of Class Association Rules Using Statistics and Genetic Relation Algorithm.
SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration, 3(5):336{345, 2011.
[95] Z. Michalewicz. Genetic Algorithms + Data Structures = Evolution Programs.
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, New York, 1996.
112
REFERENCES
[96] D. Song, M. I. Heywood, and A. N. Zicir-Heywood. A Linear Genetic Program-
ming Approach to Intrusion Detection. GECCO 2003 Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
2724:2325{2336, 2003.
[97] Z. Bankovic, D. Stepanovic, S. Bojanic, and O. N. Taladriz. Improving Network Se-
curity using Genetic Algorithm Approach. Journal of Computers and Electrical Engineering,
335-6:438{451, 2007.
[98] L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control, 8(3):338{353, 1965.
[99] A. Kandel. Fuzzy Expert Systems. Boca Raton, FL: CRC, 1992.
[100] K. Taboada, S. Mabu, E. Gonzales, K. Shimada, and K.Hirasawa. Mining Fuzzy As-
sociation Rules: A General Model Based on Genetic Network Programming and its
Applications. IEEJ Transactions on Electrical and Electronic Engineering, 5(3):343-354, 2010.
[101] S. M. Bridges and R. B. Vaughn. Fuzzy Data Mining and Genetic Algorithms Applied
to Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of the National Information Systems Security Conference
(NISSC), 2000.
[102] J. Han and J. Pei. CMAR: Accurate and Ecient Classication Based on Multiple
Class-Association Rules. In Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, pages
369{376, 2001.
[103] T. Cover and P. Hart. Nearest Neighbor Pattern Classication. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 13(1):21{27, 1967.
[104] M. Tavallaee, E. Bagheri, W. Lu, and A. A. Ghorbani. A Detailed Analysis of the
KDD CUP 99 Data Set. In Proc. of the 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence
in Security and Defense Application, pages 1{6, 2009.
[105] M. Tavallaee, E. Bagheri, W. Lu, and A. A. Ghorbani. NSLKDD Intrusion Detection
Data. http://nsl.cs.unb.ca/NSL-KDD/.
[106] C. Chang and C. Lin. LIBSVM-A Library for Support Vector Machines.
http://www.csie.edu.tw/ cjlin/libsvm/.
[107] N. Lu, S. Mabu, T. Wang, and K. Hirasawa. Distance-based Classication using Av-
erage Matching Degree and its Application to Intrusion Detection Systems. IEEJ
Transactions on Electronics, Information and Systems, 132(12), 2012.
[108] D. B. Fogel. An Introduction to Simulated Evolutionary Optimization. IEEE Trans-
actions on Neural Networks, 5(1):3{14, 1994.
[109] L. J. Fogel, A. J. Owens, and M. J. Walsh. Articial Intelligence through Simulated
Evolution. John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
[110] S. N. Sivanandam and S. N. Deepa. Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. Springer
Publishing Company, 2007.
[111] J. Koza and R. Poli. Genetic Programming. Search Methodologies, pages 127{164, 2005.
[112] S. Mabu, K. Hirasawa, and J. Hu. A Graph-Based Evolutionary Algorithm: Genetic
Network Programming (GNP) and Its Extension Using Reinforcement Learning. Evo-
lutionary Computation, MIT Press Journals, 15(3):369{398, 2007.
113
REFERENCES
[113] K. Hirasawa, T. Eguchi, J. Zhou, L. Yu, J. Hu, and S. Markon. A Double-Deck Ele-
vator Group Supervisory Control System Using Genetic Network Programming. IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, 38(4):535{550,
2008.
[114] T. Eguchi, K. Hirasawa, J. Hu, and N. Ota. A Study of Evolutionary Multiagent
Models based on Symbiosis. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B:
Cybernetics, 36(1):179{193, 2006.
114
List of Publications
Journals
J1 Nannan Lu, Shingo Mabu, Tuo Wang and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Distance-based Clas-
sification using Average Matching Degree and its Application to Intrusion De-
tection Systems”, IEEJ Transactions on Electronics, Information and Systems, Vol.
132, No. 12, accepted. (2012/08/14)
J2 Nannan Lu, Shingo Mabu, Tuo Wang and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”An Efficient Class
Association Rule Pruning Method for Unified Intrusion Detection System using
Genetic Algorithm”, IEEJ Transactions on Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Vol.
8, No. 2, accepted. (2012/01/16)
J3 Nannan Lu, Shingo Mabu and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Integrated Rule Mining based
on Fuzzy GNP and Probabilistic Classification for Intrusion Detection”, Journal
of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics, Vol. 15, No. 5,
pp. 495-505, 2011.
International Conferences (with Review Process)
C1 Nannan Lu, Shingo Mabu, Tuo Wang and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Integrated Fuzzy
GNP Rule Mining with Distance-based Classification for Intrusion Detection
System”, In Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on systems, Man and Cy-
bernetics, 2012. 10, accepted.
C2 Nannan Lu, Shingo Mabu, Tuo Wang and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Efficient Hybrid
Rule Pruning for Intrusion Detection using Multi-dimensional Probability Dis-
tribution”, In Proc. of the SICE International Annual Conference, pp. 2822-2828,
2011.
C3 Nannan Lu, ShingoMabu, Wenjng Li and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Hybrid Rule Mining
based on Fuzzy GNP and Probabilistic Classification for Intrusion Detection”, In
Proc. of the SICE International Annual Conference, pp. 2614-2619, 2010.
C4 ShingoMabu, Wenjng Li, Nannan Lu, YuWang and Kotaro Hirasawa, ”Classifica-
tion based on a multi-dimensional probability distribution and its application to
network intrusion detection”, In Proc. of the 2010 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary
Computation (CEC), pp. 1-7, October, 2010.
